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Cooperation and coordination in the context of group insolvency can promote efficiency in the 
administration of insolvency proceedings, resulting in the preservation of group synergies and going 
concern value of enterprise group members, maximization of estate value and reduction of costs. The 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (Part three), addressing the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, 
recognizes that there are decentralized groups characterized by a low degree of integration which do not 
require coordinated responses in a situation of financial distress. Nevertheless, it emphasizes that for 
many groups, cooperation and coordination may be the only way to ensure fair and efficient 
administration of proceedings and to avoid disintegration and piecemeal liquidation, causing the 
destruction of going concern value of constituent group entities.1 
Coordinated group-wide distress resolution, especially where an enterprise group is international or has 
international aspects, is promoted by legal centralization, where multiple proceedings are drawn to the 
same jurisdiction or the same court, or where a single proceeding seeks to restructure group debt (e.g. 
release of cross-guarantees). Centralization in the context of group restructuring has been supported by 
scholars.2 Yet, in the absence of a developed legal framework, territorialist inclinations may prevail,3 
leading to fragmented country-by-country responses to group distress. To achieve centralization, a legal 
framework should offer rules on international jurisdiction, recognition of foreign proceedings and relief 
that can be granted to support or defer to the centralized process. These rules may exist at three levels – 
global, regional, and domestic. 
On the global level, insolvency law has been strongly influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI),4 which deals with access to foreign courts, recognition of and relief 
to foreign insolvency proceedings and cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases. The MLCBI is a 
soft law instrument in the sense that it needs to be transposed into national law to obtain binding force. 
When it is implemented, it becomes a part of the domestic law.5 While its provisions focus on single 
debtors, the MLCBI has been instrumental in resolving complex insolvencies of groups of companies.6 
In 2019, UNCITRAL adopted a new model law – the Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency 
 
1 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part three: Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, 2010, Chapter 
III, para. 7. For the analysis of different ‘prototypes’ of group structures, see I. Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational 
Enterprise Groups, OUP, 2009, Chapter 5. 
2 See e.g. S. Bufford, Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A Proposal, Penn State Law 
Research Paper No. 1-2014, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2382123. I. Mevorach, The ‘Home Country’ of a 
Multinational Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2008, 
pp. 427-448; N. Wouters, A. Raykin, Corporate Group Cross-Border Insolvencies Between the United States & European 
Union: Legal & Economic Developments, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 387-423. 
3 I. Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency: Overcoming Biases and Closing Gaps, OUP, 2018, Chapter 2, 
discussing how territorialist inclinations and tendencies may be driven by different cognitive biases, including loss aversion, 
status quo bias, endowment effect and short termism. The debate between universalism and territorialism is well known in 
academic literature. This article does not take a side in this abstract debate but instead notes that for certain types of groups, 
coordinated responses and centralization promoted by universalism or modified universalism, may be most beneficial. For 
various positions concerning this debate, see J. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 98, Issue 7, 2000, pp. 2276-2328; L. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 7, 2000, pp. 2216-2251; E. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 32, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 819-849; A. Walters, Modified Universalism & the Role of Local Legal Culture 
in the Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Vol. 93, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 47-110; I. 
Mevorach, Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, Texas Law Review, Vol. 96, 2018, pp. 1403-1436. 
4 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997). The majority of UNCITRAL instruments can be found at 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency. 
5 Noting this transformational aspect of soft law, Pottow used the terms “semi-soft law” or “contingently soft law.” He also 
pointed out the dialogue-provoking role of soft law and its influence on evolving international norms. See J. Pottow, The 
Dialogic Aspect of Soft Law in International Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, Michigan Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 40, 2019, p. 481. 
6 I. Mevorach, On the road to Universalism: a Comparative and Empirical Study of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency, EBOR, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 537 et seq. 
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(MLEGI),7 targeting group insolvencies to encourage and enable coordination in such cases and the 
development of group solutions. Another related instrument adopted by UNCITRAL in 2018 is the 
Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (MLIJ). The MLIJ 
complements the MLCBI. It requires recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and 
clarifies that the MLCBI relief provisions include recognition and enforcement of such judgments.8 
Second, at the regional level, a leading example of an integrated market with a unique international 
framework for insolvency is the European Union (EU). The European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 
(EIR Recast),9 which replaced the original EIR of 2000, applies to insolvency proceedings opened after 
26 June 2017. It harmonizes private international law rules on international insolvency jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and insolvency-related judgments, 
communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts. The EIR Recast contains 
a new Chapter V, which offers tailored provisions on coordination of insolvency proceedings with 
regard to groups of companies. Such coordination may be carried out through the opening of an assisting 
proceeding – a group coordination proceeding.10 For recognition of group solutions falling outside of 
the EIR Recast’s scope, such as English schemes of arrangement (pre-Brexit), other regional instruments 
have been applied, including the Brussels I-bis Regulation (Brussels I-bis).11 
Third, several countries have implemented insolvency law reforms and have introduced tools aiming at 
the adoption of group-mindful solutions or making the adoption of such solutions more likely. We 
distinguish in this regard between two types of laws. 
The first type is laws specifically designed for group insolvencies. A key mechanism here is procedural 
consolidation, which manifests in the centralization of proceedings in a single forum or court. Group 
insolvency laws may also provide for substantive consolidation where assets and/or debts of the group 
entities may be pooled together in the course of insolvency proceedings. Various countries have adopted 
such laws in recent years, including Germany,12 Italy,13 Spain14 and France.15 Insolvency of corporate 
groups has also attracted attention of policymakers outside Europe. Notably, in 2019, the Insolvency 
and Bankruptcy Board of India created a Working Group on Group Insolvency to discuss and draft a 
possible group insolvency framework.16 Procedural consolidation is common in the USA, where the 
Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to file for insolvency in any bankruptcy court in which a bankruptcy 
case concerning the debtor’s affiliate is pending.17 Argentine insolvency law focuses on group 
 
7 UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency (2019). 
8 UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments with Guide to Enactment (2018) 
9 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings. 
10 EIR Recast, Article 61. For an overview, see C. Thole and M. Dueñas, Some Observations on the New Group Coordination 
Procedure of the Reformed European Insolvency Regulation, International Insolvency Review, Vol. 24, Issue 3, 2015, pp. 214-
227. 
11 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast). 
12 Insolvenzordnung (InsO), § 3a (Gruppen-Gerichtsstand) and § 56b (Gruppen-Verwalter), aiming at establishing a common 
forum and a common administrator for the group. See also § 269d-269i (Koordinationsverfahren), introducing coordination 
proceedings. 
13 Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza in attuazione della legge 19 ottobre 2017, n. 155, Art. 284. A. Zorzi, The 
Italian Law Reform, 2019, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492422. D. Corapi, D. Benincasa, The Law on Groups of 
Companies in Italy, European Company Law Journal, 16(4), 2019, pp. 121-129. 
14 Ley Concursal, Artículo 25, allowing a debtor or a creditor to submit a petition for declaration of joint insolvency proceedings 
of several debtors if they are part of the same group of companies. 
15 LOI n° 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance, l'activité et l'égalité des chances économiques (sometimes referred to as 
Loi Macron), adding Article L. 721-8 to the Code of Commerce. This article specifies jurisdiction of specialized commercial 
courts over certain insolvency proceedings and provides that companies facing an insolvency proceeding with subsidiaries in 
a similar position will be subject to the same court. 
16 Report of the Working Group on Group Insolvency, 2019.  
17 28 U.S. Code § 1408. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 1015(b). The wide range of permissible bankruptcy 
venue options, resulting in a concentration of bankruptcy cases in a few districts, attracted criticism. In 2018, Senators J. Cornyn 
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reorganizations and provides for the possibility of a single or joint application to embrace all group 
members.18 This happens in cases where insolvency of one group entity may affect other group entities 
or where entities in a group are closely integrated. Interestingly, Argentine law permits an insolvency 
application to include solvent group members, so long as it is in the interest of the group as a whole and 
facilitates group reorganization.19 In Brazil, substantive consolidation has been applied quite frequently 
in recent years in group insolvency cases.20 
The second type is laws and procedures, inspired by English schemes of arrangement, that are primarily 
used for restructuring of a debtor’s capital structure (e.g. changing the composition, conditions or 
structure of assets and/or liabilities) without disrupting business operations or causing a liquidation. We 
refer to these procedures as “schemes” or “restructurings” interchangeably, though we recognize and 
show the range of differences between them across jurisdictions. Schemes have become increasingly 
trendy as an area for global innovation and competition. In particular, this competition is pronounced in 
large cases of international groups that can afford to move between systems and that countries wish to 
attract the most. Scheme laws have recently been adopted, for example, in Singapore,21 the Netherlands22 
and Germany.23 Unlike the first type of laws, characterized by the rules expressly targeting group 
insolvencies, restructuring law reforms in the second type have not solely or specifically focused on 
groups. However, they encompass innovations which can be and are becoming instrumental in reaching 
centralized group solutions. Among such innovations are releases of intra-group obligations via a single 
proceeding (third-party releases) and flexible jurisdictional rules enabling centralized responses to group 
distress. 
This second type of procedures is the focus of this article, which examines the problem of cross-border 
recognition of schemes used for group restructuring purposes. It thus connects the national legal regimes 
with the instruments developed internationally, concentrating mainly on the global UNCITRAL Model 
Laws system. The article situates group schemes within a unique taxonomy, which combines different 
levels and forms of centralization, and asks whether the existing international insolvency law framework 
provides a solid basis for recognition of centralized restructurings, taking into account possible negative 
externalities of global competition. 
The article is structured as follows. Part I delineates the key approaches to the administration of group 
insolvencies and offers a taxonomy of levels and types of centralization, pointing to those levels that are 
most relevant to group schemes. Part II contrasts the rise of centralized solutions with the traditional 
jurisdictional standard, which focuses on individual debtor’s center of main interest (COMI). Part III 
reviews comparatively the development of scheme laws and their application to group insolvencies, 
focusing on three jurisdictions – the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands – as examples that highlight the 
shift to more dynamic jurisdictional criteria. Thus, the jurisdictional benchmarks prevalent in insolvency 
may be less relevant in view of the rise of these new restructuring procedures. Part IV further examines 
 
and E. Warren introduced the Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2018, which, among other things, seeks to limit the “affiliate-
filing rule”. 
18 Argentine Insolvency Law No. 24522 (LCQ), Chapter VI, Articles 65-68. See M.E. Uzal, National Report on Argentina, in 
R.M. Manóvil, Groups of Companies: A Comparative Law Overview, Springer, 2020, pp. 614-616. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For a critical view of the Brazilian group insolvency approach, see Sheila Neder Cerezetti, Reorganization of Corporate 
Groups in Brazil: Substantive Consolidation and the Limited Liability Tale, International Insolvency Review, Vol. 30(2), 2021, 
noting that the current Brazilian cases of substantive consolidation treat “an exceptional measure as a day-to-day event, 
dramatically altering the rights of creditors and the obligations of debtors without regard to the limitation of liability.” 
21 Singapore Companies (Amendment) Act 2017; Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (No. 40 of 2018). 
22 Act on Court Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans (Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord or WHOA), available 
at https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20200526/gewijzigd_voorstel_van_wet_3. 
23 Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung des Sanierungs- und Insolvenzrechts, Bundesgesetzblatt Jahrgang 2020, Teil I, Nr. 66 zu Bonn 
am 29. Dezember 2020. 
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the implications of the growth of schemes. It notes that they can result in jurisdictional plurality, trigger 
jurisdictional conflicts and undermine creditors’ legitimate expectations. Against these backdrops, Part 
V explores whether the MLCBI accommodates centralized group solutions performed via schemes. Part 
VI then studies whether the newer instruments – the MLIJ and in particular the MLEGI – offer greater 
possibilities and a desirable framework for the realization and recognition of centralized group solutions. 
Part VII identifies the weak spots in the current international regime and shares the ideas for its further 
development in order to accommodate centralized group restructurings and promote constructive global 
competition in insolvency. 
 
I. Levels of Centralization for Group Restructuring  
In practice, there are different ways to structure group insolvency proceedings to address their financial 
distress.24 As noted above, oftentimes the most effective way is through some form of centralization. 
We distinguish here between procedural and operational centralization.  
Procedural centralization involves concentration of separate insolvency (in a broad sense and including 
restructuring) proceedings in a single forum or in one court.25 It also manifests itself in situations where 
obligations of several group entities are restructured in a single proceeding opened with respect to one 
group member. Thus, procedural centralization is determined by reference to either the number of 
proceedings (one proceeding that also has wider effects on non-debtor members of a group) or their 
localization (several proceedings but consolidated in one forum or court). Operational centralization 
deals with how group entities are controlled, managed, or directed in insolvency. For example, 
operational centralization may be achieved by way of appointing the same insolvency practitioner (IP) 
in multiple proceedings,26 or by the opening an assisting proceeding that assumes additional 
coordinating or managerial-like functions.27 As opposed to procedural centralization, operational 
centralization is not premised on the number or the location of proceedings but looks at the concentration 
of the decision-making roles and functions. 
Procedural and operational centralization are often correlated and go hand in hand. For example, 
concentration of proceedings in the same jurisdiction makes it more likely that the same IP will be 
appointed, resulting in the centralized management of the proceedings. Conceptualizing different forms 
of centralization, Graph 1 distinguishes eight levels of tackling financial distress in enterprise groups.  
Level 8 indicates the minimum level or the absence of any centralization. From that level, the graph 
moves up to indicate other approaches, which enable higher procedural and operational centralization. 
Thus, Level 7 envisages a degree of communication and cooperation in the process, even though in a 
 
24 See R. van Galen, Insolvent Groups of Companies in Cross Border Cases and Rescue Plans, Report to the Netherlands 
Association for Comparative and International Insolvency Law (conference of 8 November 2012), p. 29, at 
http://www.nvrii.nl/uploads/files/NVRII_Preadviezen_2012.pdf. Van Galen distinguishes six solutions for the treatment of 
insolvencies of international groups in relation to the EU, from coordination on a non-hierarchical basis to substantive 
consolidation and a flexible (case-by-case) approach. 
25 This is a form of procedural consolidation. D. Zhang, Reconsidering Procedural Consolidation for Multinational Corporate 
Groups in the Context of the Recast European Insolvency Regulation, International Insolvency Review, Vol. 26, Issue 3, p. 
335, listing among the benefits of procedural consolidation “preservation of group value, reduction of costs arising from 
multiple insolvency proceedings and avoiding the interruption of legal personality of subsidiaries in the same group.” See also 
J. Sarra, Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business Enterprise Group Insolvency Proceeding, Texas International Law 
Journal, Vol. 44, Issue 4, pp. 547-576. 
26 EIR Recast, Recitals 50 and 53; InsO, § 56b; The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/ debtor 
Regimes, 2015, C17.4; MLEGI, Article 17. 
27 The opening of special proceedings to coordinate separate insolvency or restructuring proceedings is envisaged in the EIR 
Recast (Article 61). Besides, the EIR Recast leaves open the possibility for IPs to agree to grant additional powers to an IP 
appointed in one of the group proceedings (Article 56(2)). 
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rather sporadic manner. Level 6 is distinguished by an increasingly organized way of cross-border 
communication and cooperation, which may be facilitated by the adoption of insolvency protocols or 
cooperation agreements.28 Level 5 streamlines coordination of parallel proceedings through the opening 
of a special assisting proceeding, such as a group coordination proceeding under the EIR Recast. Level 
4 represents concentration of proceedings in the same forum or the same court. Level 3 relates to a 
situation where the same IP is appointed in proceedings concerning enterprise group members. Level 2 
permits the resolution of group’s financial problems in a single proceeding concerning a single group 
member but extending its effects to other group members. Level 1 is substantive consolidation.29 
Graph 1. Procedural and operational centralization in group restructurings 
 
The above Graph also encompasses differences between group centralizations in term of the extent to 
which they implicate or encroach on the entity separateness. Some approaches to group insolvencies 
entail a strict entity-by-entity treatment that stresses legal separateness of group entities and does not 
allow any of the proceedings to assume a coordinating role. This entity-based approach seeks to preserve 
the boundaries of a corporate veil and may also be intertwined with territorialism. Thus, local control 
over local entities can be maintained.30 Other approaches promote coordinated administration of 
proceedings, departing from a strict entity-by-entity view and recognizing that developing a common 
 
28 UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation, 2009, Introduction, para. 13, defines a cross-border 
insolvency agreement as “an oral or written agreement intended to facilitate the coordination of cross‐border insolvency 
proceedings and cooperation between courts, between courts and insolvency representatives and between insolvency 
representatives.” Insolvency protocols have proven critical in facilitating efficient resolution of complex insolvencies, including 
insolvencies of large multinational enterprises, such as Lehman Brothers, Nortel Networks and Bernard Madoff Investment 
Securities. Recently protocols have been embraced in airline insolvency cases of LATAM and Jet Airways. On insolvency 
protocols, see I. Kokorin, B. Wessels, Cross-Border Protocols in Insolvencies of Multinational Enterprise Groups, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2021. 
29 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part three, Chapter II, para. 107, noting that while substantive 
consolidation is typically discussed in the liquidation context, it may in principle be used in group reorganizations, including 
by way of a reorganization plan. The EIR Recast in Article 72(3) prescribes that a group coordination plan shall not include 
recommendations as to any consolidation of proceedings or insolvency estates. 
30 I. Mevorach, Towards a Consensus on the Treatment of Multinational Enterprise Groups in Insolvency, Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010, p. 385. 
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solution may safeguard group synergies and the going concern value of group entities and the group as 
a whole, potentially resulting in greater payouts to creditors. Still, such approaches do not encroach on 
the entity separateness, because group entities retain their independence and asset/liabilities separateness 
is preserved. On the other side of the spectrum, as an outlier, is substantive consolidation, i.e. Level 1. 
Here the high level of operational and procedural centralization interacts with disregard of the corporate 
veil. At least in its full form, substantive consolidation leads to a pooling of assets and liabilities of 
several companies together as if they are a single legal entity.31 It sacrifices the separate legal personality 
to avoid disproportionate expense or delay due to disentangling “asset integrated” entities.32 
The purpose of the proposed taxonomy is not to suggest that some approaches are superior to others. 
We wish to avoid oversimplification, overlooking the diversity of group forms and structures.33 Whereas 
a closely integrated group may benefit from coordinated efforts and centralized crisis responses, for non-
integrated groups with truly separate businesses such efforts might be unnecessary. They may lead to 
an increase in transaction costs arising from negotiations of a cross-border insolvency protocol or from 
the opening of a group coordination or a planning proceeding. Substantive consolidation is particularly 
controversial as it affects the distribution between creditors where creditors of a single debtor are forced 
to share the estate value with creditors of all consolidated entities. Thus, it leads to imposed wealth 
redistribution, profoundly affecting creditors’ property rights and recoveries.34 However, in relevant 
circumstances, substantive consolidation can immensely reduce transaction costs and simplify the 
insolvency process, including by resolving cross-liability arrangements (intercompany loans, cross-
guarantees, co-debtorship, intercompany avoidance actions) as the separateness of legal entities and 
insolvency estates disappears.  
In practice, legal tools and mechanisms emerge to achieve greater centralization in restructuring of 
multinational enterprise groups. Schemes permit centralization corresponding to Levels 2 and 4 of the 
Graph. Level 4 involves concentration of group members’ restructurings in the same forum or the same 
court.35 It simplifies the adoption of a coherent group-wide solution and reduces costs. Level 2 permits 
resolution of group distress via a single proceeding opened with respect to a single group entity by 
extending restructuring effects to affiliated entities acting as co-debtors, guarantors, and collateral 
providers. In addition to a significant cost reduction,36 this mechanism makes it possible to preserve 
operational continuity of group entities and going concern value of the group.37 This outcome is achieved 
insofar as debt of several companies is restructured without each of them entering a formal proceeding. 
 
31 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part three, Chapter II, para. 135, noting that substantive consolidation 
can be partial or limited, excluding certain assets or claims. 
32 Substantive consolidation is typically restricted to cases of intermingling of assets and liabilities within an enterprise group, 
or to cases of fraud and abuse of corporate form. For example, according to French law, the “commenced proceedings may be 
extended to one or more other persons where their assets are intermingled with those of the debtor or where the legal entity is 
a sham.” Article L. 621-2 Commercial Code. In a similar vein, Spanish law exceptionally allows substantive consolidation 
“when there is confusion of assets and it is not possible to separate the ownership of assets and liabilities without incurring an 
unjustified expense or delay.” Article 25 ter. 2 LC. 
33 I. Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups, OUP, 2009, p. 132, distinguishing groups based on three 
dimensions, such as ‘business integration’, ‘asset integration’ and ‘weak or no integration’. 
34 C. Frost, Organizational Form, Misappropriation Risk, and the Substantive Consolidation of Corporate Groups, Hastings 
Law Journal, Vol. 44, Issue 3, 1993, p. 451. W. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, The George 
Washington Law Review, Vol. 75 (2), 2007, p. 306, accepting that “a substantive consolidation might defeat expectations of 
creditors who had advanced funds to the separate legal entities.” 
35 It may also be (and frequently is) accompanied by the appointment of a single IP, reaching Level 3. 
36 See S. Lubben, The costs of corporate bankruptcy: how little we know, in B. Adler (ed.), Research Handbook on Corporate 
Bankruptcy Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, p. 276, discussing direct costs of insolvency (e.g. professional fees associated 
with reorganization, court filing fees) and indirect costs, which are more abstract (e.g. managerial time, lost revenues, lost 
opportunities and lost goodwill). 
37 This strategy can be compared to a Single Point of Entry (SPOE) strategy, used in bank resolution, whereas resolution powers 
(e.g. bail-in, transfer tools) are applied at the top parent or holding company level, while operating subsidiaries continue as a 
going concern without entering resolution. See FSB, Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial 
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Centralization of group solutions,38 however, could prima facie clash with the traditional jurisdictional 
standard in insolvency that focuses on each entity’s COMI. We discuss next the development of the 
COMI rule and its application in the group context.  
 
 
II. COMI and the Rise of Group Centralization in Insolvency 
A. COMI: Rise, Rationale, and Interpretation 
The concept of COMI is well-known to insolvency scholars and practitioners. Its origins can be traced 
to the 1980 Draft Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar 
Proceedings (Draft Convention).39 This Draft Convention was one of the early attempts to harmonize 
private international law issues in the area of insolvency in the European Economic Community. Even 
though it was not adopted, the idea of using a jurisdictional link based on debtor’s place of administration 
of main interests, proposed therein,40 survived. It was repeated in multiple documents drafted in the 
1990s, including the Istanbul Convention41 and the European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 
(1995 Convention)42 – a document that has strongly influenced both the MLCBI and the EIR (now 
recast).43 
The 1995 Convention and the authoritative report accompanying it, Virgós-Schmit Report,44 proposed 
a model in which main insolvency proceedings having a universal scope were linked to and could be 
opened at the jurisdiction of the debtor’s COMI. The same approach is now followed by the EIR Recast, 
under which “centre of main interests” is defined as a place where the debtor “conducts the 
administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third parties.”45 In case of 
a legal entity, the place of the registered office is presumed to be the debtor’s COMI in the absence of 
 
Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies, 2013. See also J. Jennings-Mares, A. Pinedo, O. Ireland, 
The Single Point of Entry Approach to Bank Resolution, in J.-H. Binder, D. Singh (eds.), Bank Resolution: The European 
Regime, OUP, 2016. 
38 The term “group insolvency solution” has been introduced in the MLEGI (Article 2(f)). A group insolvency solution may 
result in “reorganization, sale or liquidation of some or all of the assets and operations of one or more enterprise group 
members” in order to protect, preserve or enhance the overall combined value of the participating enterprise group members. 
It is therefore the intention of the MLEGI to offer a flexible concept that may be adjusted to the specific circumstances and 
needs of a corporate group, its business model and degree of integration between its members. Group insolvency solutions can 
be achieved by different means, entailing varying degrees of procedural and operational centralization. This article adopts the 
definition of a group insolvency solution used in the MLEGI but recognizes that new restructuring laws most commonly target 
financial restructuring rather than liquidation. 
39 Draft Convention on bankruptcy, winding-up, arrangements, compositions, and similar proceedings. Report on the draft 
Convention. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/82 (1982), Article 3(1), laying down the rule that “[w]here 
the centre of administration of the debtor is situated in one of the Contracting States, the courts of that State shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction to declare the debtor bankrupt.” At http://aei.pitt.edu/5480/1/5480.pdf. For the discussion of the origins of COMI 
in Europe, see I. Tirado, An Evolution of COMI in the European Insolvency Regulation: From ‘Insolvenzimperialismus’ to the 
Recast, in J. Sarra and B. Romaine (eds.), Annual Review of Insolvency Law (2015), pp. 691-722. 
40 Draft Convention, Article 3(2). 
41 European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, Istanbul, 5.VI.1990. The Istanbul Convention was 
drafted by a committee of experts subordinate to the European Committee on Legal Co-operation. It was signed by 8 countries 
(Luxemburg, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Germany, France, Cyprus and Belgium), but ratified only by Cyprus. The Istanbul 
Convention never entered into force, as this would have required ratification by at least 3 countries. 
42 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 23 November 1995, available at http://aei.pitt.edu/2840/. 
43 The influence of the 1995 Convention on the Model Law 1997 is evident from its Guide to Enactment (1997), confirming in 
para. 18 that the “Model Law takes into account the results of other international efforts, including the Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings of the European Union.” 
44 Virgós and Schmit 1996. The report has been frequently referred to by advocates general in their opinions on particular cases 
involving interpretation of the EIR. 
45 EIR Recast, Article 3(1). 
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proof to the contrary.46 The key role of ascertainability and importance of the registered office 
presumption in determining COMI have been acknowledged in cases decided by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU).47 As Virgós and Garcimartín explain, the “objective ascertainability of the 
centre of main interests is an important factor, as it enables creditors to calculate the commercial or 
financial risk they face in the event of the debtor’s insolvency.”48 
COMI performs three main functions within the system of the EIR Recast. First, it allocates international 
insolvency jurisdiction for the opening of main insolvency proceedings, having a universal scope. 
Second, COMI jurisdiction usually determines the law applicable to insolvency proceedings (lex 
concursus), their effects on rights and duties of a debtor and its creditors. For example, this law governs 
powers of an IP, ranking of claims, composition of insolvency estate, etc.49 Third, the location of COMI 
influences the powers of IPs in a cross-border setting.50 
The concept of COMI is an integral part of the UNCITRAL instruments (further explored in Parts V-
VII), even though its role differs significantly from that played under the EIR Recast.51 According to the 
MLCBI, COMI is key to determining the type of a foreign proceeding (i.e. main v. non-main) and the 
respective relief available to it prior to or upon recognition.52 COMI can also affect recognition decisions 
under the MLIJ, as it permits recognition of an insolvency-related judgment to be refused if it originates 
from a state in which the debtor has neither COMI nor establishment.53 Within the framework of the 
MLEGI, COMI is relevant to the opening of a planning proceeding – a major innovation foreseen as a 
tool to improve the administration of group insolvencies and to develop a group insolvency solution.54 
A planning proceeding is defined as a main proceeding commenced in respect of a group member, 
provided that this group member is likely to be a necessary and integral participant in a group insolvency 
solution, and in which other group members are participating for the purpose of developing a group 
solution.55 The MLEGI adds that a court can recognize as a planning proceeding a proceeding that is 
separate from the main proceeding, if that separate proceeding has been approved by the court which 
 
46 Ibid. 
47 Eurofood IFSC Ltd., Case C-341/04, 2 May 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:281, para. 33, noting that COMI “must be identified by 
reference to criteria that are both objective and ascertainable by third parties” and that “objectivity and […] possibility of 
ascertainment by third parties are necessary in order to ensure legal certainty and foreseeability.” See also Interedil, Case 
C-396/09, 20 October 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:671, para. 49. I. Mevorach, Jurisdiction in Insolvency: A Study of European 
Courts’ Decisions, Journal of Private International Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, pp. 327-357.  
48 M. Virgós and F. Garcimartín, The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice, Kluwer Law International, 2004, p. 
42. Similarly, the Virgós-Schmit Report in para. 75 stipulates that, since insolvency is a foreseeable risk, it is “important that 
international jurisdiction […] be based on a place known to the debtor’s potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which 
would have to be assumed in the case of insolvency to be calculated.” 
49 EIR Recast, Article 7. 
50 EIR Recast, Article 21. 
51 R. Bork, The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, International 
Insolvency Review, Vol. 26, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 255-258, discussing COMI under the EIR Recast, the MLCBI and other 
regulations. 
52 MLCBI, Articles 20-21. 
53 MLIJ, Article 14(h), which is an optional provision that states may decide to implement. The concept of establishment has 
been developed in parallel to COMI. It is used in the EIR Recast (Article 2(10)) and the MLCBI (Article 2(f)). Under the 
former, it indicates a jurisdiction where secondary proceedings, having a territorial scope, may be opened. Pursuant to the latter, 
establishment characterizes non-main proceedings. It refers to the place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-
transitory economic activity with human means and goods. 
or services. 
54 Read further I. Mevorach, A Fresh View on the Hard/Soft Law Divide: Implications for International Insolvency of Enterprise 
Groups, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, 2019, pp. 505-530. 
55 MLEGI, Article 2(g). As to the requirement that a group entity should be “necessary and integral” to a group insolvency 
solution, the Guide to the MLEGI states in para. 46 that the relevant factors may include “the structure of the enterprise group, 
the degree of integration between members, the group insolvency solution that is to be proposed.” It recognizes in para. 45 that 
there can be more than one planning proceeding in an insolvency concerning the same enterprise group, for example, where 
such a group is horizontally organized or where different plans are required for different parts of the group. 
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has jurisdiction over the main proceedings.56 In both cases, the jurisdiction of the main proceeding 
(COMI-jurisdiction) is determinative to the opening of a planning proceeding (although other 
participating members may not have their COMI in the same place). 
Thus, while the UNCITRAL instruments do not regulate international jurisdiction for main or non-main 
insolvency proceedings, these instruments, in particular the MLCBI, consider COMI as a crucial factor 
determining the powers and effects of such proceedings. COMI should be interpreted in a uniform way.57 
It must be the place known to the debtor’s actual and potential creditors. For contractual relations and 
(less so) in property law, parties may adjust their relations, ex ante or ex post, for example by choosing 
an available remedy and a dispute resolution mechanism. This is generally not the case with insolvency 
law, which in many instances curbs party autonomy to ensure collective debt enforcement and pari 
passu value distribution among creditors.58 The past decades have witnessed the expansion of secured 
credit and powers of secured creditors in insolvency,59 conclusion of intercreditor agreements and 
restructuring support agreements, increasing control of debtor in possession (DIP) financiers over the 
insolvency process.60 These developments could signal the rise of a new contract paradigm in insolvency 
law.61 However, this insolvency-related contracting rarely extends to the determination or a choice of 
insolvency forum or applicable insolvency law.62 In this area, party autonomy continues to be largely 
restricted. As will be shown below, the proliferation of schemes creates more options and choices for 
parties, opening the doors for centralized group restructuring solutions. 
B. Group Insolvency and Limits of COMI 
As we have seen, COMI originated in the 1980s. At that time, the insolvency of groups of companies 
was not widely debated or dealt with. In the academic literature of the 1980s, insolvency of corporate 
groups was only sparsely discussed.63 It is recognized that when the text of the MLCBI was debated, 
 
56 This addition allows recognition as a planning proceeding of a group coordination proceeding, opened under the EIR Recast, 
as long as the latter has been opened by the court of the main insolvency proceeding. 
57 Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the MLCBI (2013), para. 82, stating that “the formulation “centre of main interests” 
in the EC Regulation corresponds to that of the Model Law” so that the “jurisprudence interpreting the EC Regulation may 
also be relevant to interpretation of the Model Law.” 
58 T. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 91, No. 5, 
1982, pp. 857-907, justifying insolvency’s collective proceedings by the inability of dispersed creditors to effectively contract 
with one another over the best response to debtor’s financial distress. See also D. Baird, T. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations 
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests, University of Chicago Law Review, 51, 1984, pp. 97-130. 
59 A. Nocilla, Asset Sales and Secured Creditor Control in Restructuring: A Comparison of the UK, US and Canadian Models, 
International Insolvency Review, Vol. 26, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 60-81; ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Full 
Report, 2014, p. 12. 
60 The ever-increasing control by secured creditors over the insolvency process has been particularly emphasized in the US 
literature. See D. Baird and R. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, 2002, pp. 751-789; 
D. Skeel, Creditors’ Ball: The New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152, 
No. 2, 2003, p. 918, noting that “[w]hereas the debtor and its managers seemed to dominate bankruptcy only a few decades 
ago, Chapter 11 now has a distinctly creditor-oriented cast.” K. Ayotte and E. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in 
Chapter 11, Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 511–551. See also R. Rasmussen, The end of bankruptcy 
revisited, in B. Adler (ed.), Research Handbook on Corporate Bankruptcy Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, p. 42, 
mentioning among the factors strengthening the position of secured creditors in insolvency: 1998 amendments to Article 9 
UCC, making it easier to obtain a blanket security interest in all debtor’s assets; debtor-in-possession financing and the use of 
far-reaching lending covenants, giving a senior lender control over debtor’s access to cash in its accounts. 
61 D. Skeel, G. Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 166, 
Issue 7, 2018, pp. 1777-1817. See also J. Karas, M. Harland, S. Foreman, When ‘Where’ Matters: Anchoring Jurisdiction in 
Insolvency, INSOL Special Report, 2015. 
62 I. Kokorin, Contracting around insolvency jurisdiction: private ordering in European insolvency jurisdiction rules and 
practices, in V. Lazić V. and S. Stuij (eds.), Recasting the Insolvency Regulation: Improvements and Missed Opportunities. 
Short Studies in Private International Law, Asser Press, 2020, pp. 21-58. 
63 See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 
Little Brown, 1983. P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or Reorganization of Parent & 
Subsidiary Corporations Including Law of Corporate Guarantees, Little Brown, 1985. P. Blumberg, Limited Liability and 
Corporate Group, The Journal of Corporation Law, 11, 1986, pp. 573-631. 
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“groups were regarded as “a stage too far.”64 Indeed, the MLCBI and the EIR did not address the issue 
of group insolvency, and neither envisioned a notion of “group COMI”. Instead, both had a single-entity 
debtor in mind. This “singular” or “group-neutral” vision was supported by the CJEU’s decision in 
Eurofood IFSC Ltd.65 The same idea of entity-by-entity COMI determination underpins the findings in 
Rastelli Davide e C. Snc v. Jean-Charles Hidoux,66 in which the court stressed that even if property of 
two companies had been intermixed, COMI determination had to be carried out separately for each 
company as each debtor constituted a distinct legal entity, subject to its own court jurisdiction. 
The adoption in 2015 of the EIR Recast has not changed this singular vision despite the fact that a new 
chapter was added to promote coordinated administration of group insolvencies.67 The EIR Recast 
acknowledges that a court should be able to open insolvency proceedings for several companies 
belonging to the same group in one jurisdiction, “if the court finds that the centre of main interests of 
those companies is located in a single Member State.”68 In other words, COMI of each separate entity 
should be established in the same jurisdiction in order to achieve full centralization. Following the 
authoritative interpretation of the CJEU, European courts have been cautious in accepting the rebuttal 
of the registered office presumption and have required convincing evidence that COMI is located in a 
jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction of debtor’s registered office. For example, in the case concerning 
COMI of a special purpose financial vehicle (SPV) Oi Coop, registered in the Netherlands but fully 
dependent on the management and operational centre of the group located in Brazil (where a group-
wide restructuring was under way), the Dutch Supreme Court concluded that the registered office 
presumption was not rebutted.69 
We should note, however, that the interpretation of COMI with respect to enterprise groups and their 
members has not been fully consistent across jurisdictions. Not all courts have followed the strict line 
(entity-based approach) drawn by the CJEU. In many insolvencies of groups, courts have adopted a 
group-mindful interpretation of COMI, considering group interdependencies and the economic realities 
where group entities may have been centrally controlled in a particular jurisdiction.70 In determining a 
debtor’s COMI, US courts have used the concept of a “nerve center”, referring to a location from where 
debtor’s activities are directed and controlled.71 As opposed to the findings of the Dutch court, referred 
to above, the US court found that COMI of Oi Coop, acting as an SPV, was in Brazil – the location of 
the corporate “nerve center”.72 The concept of a nerve center has also been embraced in Canadian case 
 
64 UNCITRAL Working Group V, Thirty-eighth session, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part three: 
Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency, 11 February 2010, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92/Add.1, p. 3. 
65 Supra note 47. For critical analysis of the CJEU’s decision in Eurofood, see S. Bufford, Center of Main Interests, International 
Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood Decision of the European Court of Justice, Northwestern Journal 
of International Law & Business, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 351-419. 
66 Rastelli Davide e C. Snc v. Jean-Charles Hidoux, C-191/10, 15 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:838. 
67 EIR Recast, Chapter V. 
68 EIR Recast, Recital 53. 
69 Decision of the Dutch Supreme Court, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:1280, July 7, 2017. See further the case concerning insolvency of 
NIKI, an Austrian subsidiary of Air Berlin (LG Berlin, 84 T 2/18, Jan. 8, 2018), where the Austrian registered office prevailed, 
despite significant ties and dependence on a parent company, located in Germany. See also In the Matter of Videology Limited 
[2018] EWHC 2186 (Ch), where the court noted that the debtor, registered in England and Wales, was part of a larger corporate 
group with its parent incorporated in Delaware, the USA. This is also where strategic management decisions were made. 
However, the court was not persuaded that the registered office presumption had been rebutted, since the debtor’s trade 
premises, customers and creditor relations were located in the UK. 
70 See I. Mevorach, Jurisdiction in insolvency – a study of European courts’ decisions, Journal of Private International Law, 
Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, pp. 327-357. 
71 In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R. 83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
72 Order Granting Recognition of Foreign Main Proceeding and Certain Related Relief, July 22, 2016, In re OI S.A., No. 16-
11791 [ECF No. 38] (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). See also In re Serviços de Petróleo de Constellation S.A., 600 B.R. 237 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2019), noting that a court may consider a debtor’s “nerve center”, including from where its activities are directed and 
controlled (‘principal executive office of the group of companies’) in determining COMI. In this case, the central coordination 
of the rigs happened in Brazil. The court paid attention to the fact that the foreign entities were members of an integrated 
Draft, February 2021 
12 
 
law in determining COMI of a group entity.73 Group-sensitive COMI determination was shown by the 
Australian courts in the case concerning insolvency of Buccaneer, an Australian listed company with 
main activities in the USA, where its subsidiaries engaged in the exploitation of various oil and gas 
assets. Finding COMI of the Australian-registered parent company to be in the USA, the Australian 
court took into account the overall group structure and the role played in it by the debtor in question as 
it appeared to third parties.74 Citing the Buccaneer judgment, and in contrast to the CJEU logic (relying 
on entity separateness and entity-centered COMI view), the High Court of Singapore in Re Zetta Jet 
held that “in ascertaining a specific company’s COMI, there is no need to maintain strictly the distinction 
between different entities within a group. It is possible for the analysis to be made of the activities of an 
entire group of companies, rather than of the specific debtor company in question.”75 
The divergence of approaches to the determination and interpretation of COMI,76 its inherent ambiguity 
and, at times, inflexibility, make it a difficult standard to apply when contemplating a centralized group 
restructuring. For groups of companies with several operating subsidiaries in different jurisdictions and 
having decentralized management, it may be difficult to locate COMIs of all or the majority of the group 
entities in the same country.77 As a result, a centralized group restructuring is unlikely.78 The problem 
can also be framed differently. It may be questioned whether COMI as an autonomous concept is at all 
the right method to achieve a group centralization in insolvency. Against this backdrop, the next Part III 
discusses the emergence of restructuring procedures that can be used to restructure group debt in a 
centralized manner, including by employing alternative, more flexible jurisdictional criteria. 
 
III. The Rise of Schemes and a Sufficient Connection Test 
We first describe English schemes of arrangement (including the newer restructuring plan regime) with 
emphasis on their cross-border aspects. We then look at the expansion of schemes around the world and 
in particular the influence of English schemes on the equivalent regimes developed in the Netherlands 
and Germany. This review and the focused examples aim to show the growth of the market for schemes 
that also embraces more lenient norms concerning jurisdiction.  
A. “Sufficient Connection” Test as a Jurisdictional Threshold 
English schemes of arrangement are well known around the world. They constitute a flexible statutory 
mechanism to facilitate and implement “a compromise or arrangement between a company and its 
creditors, or any class of them, or its members, or any class of them.”79 When sanctioned by a court, a 
 
enterprise group and analyzed group roles and relations in some detail. It found that for a holding/financing company, the 
location of its subsidiaries, from which it generated the actual positive cash flows, was relevant to the COMI analysis. 
73 Massachusetts Elephant & Castle Group Inc. (Re), 2011 ONSC 4201, 2011 CarswellOnt 6610, holding that the location of 
the “debtor’s headquarters or head office functions or nerve centre” is usually significant in interpreting COMI. The integration 
of a specific debtor within the larger enterprise was also recognized as a “significant factor” to determining its COMI. See CHC 
Group Ltd. (Re), 2016 BCSC 2623, 2016 CarswellBC 3949. See also Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc., Re (2011), 2011 BCSC 
115, 2011 CarswellBC 124, 76 C.B.R. (5th) 317, setting among the factors relevant to COMI determination, the extent of 
integration of an enterprise’s international operations, existence of shared management within entities and in an organization, 
consolidated management of an enterprise. 
74 Young, Jr, in the matter of Buccaneer Energy Limited v Buccaneer Energy Limited [2014] FCA 711. 
75 Re: Zetta Jet Pte Ltd and others (Asia Aviation Holdings Pte Ltd, intervener) [2019] SGHC 53, para. 83. 
76 For the review of such differences, see I. Kokorin and B. Wessels, COMIs under Chapter 15 and EIR Recast: Brothers, but 
not Twins, ABI Journal, August 2018. 
77 See Mevorach, supra note 2. 
78 Mevorach, supra note 54, at 521, emphasizing that the “absence of explicit provisions concerning the centralization of group 
proceedings can result in uncertainty regarding the possibility of opening such proceedings in the same place or granting them 
recognition and relief.” 
79 Companies Act 2006, Part 26, Section 895(1). 
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scheme becomes binding on the company and its shareholders and relevant creditors.80 It is essentially 
an instrument to solve a holdout problem, as it permits the majority of shareholders or creditors to bind 
the minority within a class (intra class cram-down). In a purely out-of-court workout, such a cram-down 
would not be possible. While originating in the 19th century, schemes of arrangement have not gained 
their popularity until the 2000s,81 when they have proven to be a useful procedure to reorganize debt 
and/or equity of a company, to re-arrange its contractual or similar liabilities and to alter creditors’ rights 
(e.g. extend maturity dates, release security, write-off debt), to effect a debt-to-equity swap, to compel 
creditors to accept an assignment of their claims, etc.82 We will explore some of the key substantive 
requirements for schemes and their differences in Part V in the context of cross-border recognition and 
assistance. Here we concentrate on the private international law aspects, and specifically on the unique 
approach to establishing international jurisdiction. 
Unlike the majority of insolvency and restructuring proceedings across the EU, English schemes of 
arrangement had been deliberately excluded from the scope of the EIR Recast (when the UK was still 
part of the EU).83 Therefore, the high jurisdictional threshold of COMI did not apply. Instead, English 
courts use a different, far less stringent and straightforward “sufficient connection” test – connection 
between the proposed scheme of arrangement and the UK.84 This test was elaborated over time through 
case law. Among the criteria which were found to be enough to establish a sufficient connection to 
sanction a scheme are: English law governed debt of key finance contracts and principal activity of the 
debtor in England;85 English law governed contracts;86 English domicile of creditors holding >50% by 
value of claims; choice of English law and jurisdiction of English courts in the facilities agreement;87 
purposeful alteration of the governing law and the jurisdiction clause in contracts to English law and 
English courts;88 and movement of operations to England and domicile of 18% of the scheme creditors 
in England.89 
English courts have also referred to the potential applicability of the Brussels I-bis and its jurisdictional 
rules. They adhered to the position that the question whether schemes of arrangement fell within the 
scope of the Brussels I-bis was not completely resolved. However, they have taken a pragmatic approach 
and assumed that it applied, and scrutinized whether the court would have jurisdiction over scheme 
creditors on that assumption. Under the Brussels I-bis, as a general rule, persons domiciled in a Member 
State shall be sued in the courts of that Member State.90 However, to avoid irreconcilable judgments in 
connected actions and to facilitate expedient dispute resolution, a joint jurisdiction may be established.91 
 
80 Ibid, Section 899(3). 
81 On the historical developments of schemes of arrangement, see J. Payne, Schemes of Arrangement: Theory, Structure and 
Operations, CUP, 2014. 
82 G. Moss et al. Giving Effect to Debt Compromise Arrangements – Binding the Minority or Out of the Money Classes of 
Creditors, in C. Mallon and S. Waisman (eds.), The Law and Practice of Restructuring in the UK and US, OUP, 2011, para. 
7.100. 
83 Schemes of arrangement were not included in Annex A to the EIR Recast, as formally they were not classified as proceedings 
under a law relating to insolvency, instead constituting an instrument of company law. See P. Mankowski, The European World 
of Insolvency Tourism: Renewed, But Still Brave? Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 64, 2017, p. 106. 
84 Re Drax Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 WLR 1049. In Re Drax Holdings, the court established that a foreign company can be wound 
up in England if three requirements are met: 1) there must be a sufficient connection with England; 2) there must be a reasonable 
possibility, if a winding up order is made, of benefit to those applying for the winding up order; 3) one or more persons 
interested in the distribution of assets of the company must be persons over whom the court can exercise jurisdiction.  
85 Ibid. 
86 Re Primacom Holding GmbH [2011] EWHC 3746 Ch; Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Groups [2013] EWHC 2476 (Ch), 
2013 WL 3994997. 
87 In the Matter of Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), 2011 WL 1151484. 
88 In the Matter of Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH and Others [2014] EWHC 1867 (Ch), 2014 WL 2530822. See also Algeco 
Scotsman PIK S.A. [2017] EWHC 2236 (Ch), 2017 WL 02672218. 
89 In the Matter of Noble Group Limited [2018] EWHC 3092 (Ch), 2018 WL 05982647. 
90 Brussels I-bis, Article 4(1). 
91 Ibid., Article 8(1). 
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As a result, multiple defendants can be sued in the same jurisdiction. In 2016, in DTEK Finance Plc,92 
it was decided that if at least one scheme creditor (considered by English courts as a defendant for the 
purposes of the Brussels I-bis) was domiciled in England, the Brussels I-bis conferred jurisdiction on 
English courts to sanction a scheme affecting rights of creditors domiciled outside England. Notably, in 
some other cases it was suggested that a single creditor domiciled in England (“anchor defendant”) may 
be insufficient and that courts need to take into account the number and size of creditors.93 Nevertheless, 
in more recent cases, courts confirmed that in principle the domicile of a single creditor in the court’s 
jurisdiction sufficed to approve a scheme affecting foreign creditors.94 This interpretation created a wide 
jurisdictional basis for approving schemes and for centralizing the case in a single forum on expediency 
grounds.95 
From this concise overview, we can see that international jurisdiction for schemes of arrangement can 
be premised on different factors. These factors are distinct from those applicable to the determination of 
COMI or establishment. They are more flexible. Oftentimes, steps are taken to create the jurisdiction of 
English courts, including by changing the applicable law in a contract to English law, transferring 
operations to England or establishing a company in the UK solely for the purpose of creating a 
jurisdictional basis for a scheme.96 
The UK has reformed its restructuring law in 2020. The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 
(CIGA) entered into force on 26 June 2020 and introduced modern procedures and tools to assist 
struggling businesses. Among them is the Restructuring Plan, a procedure that is similar to a scheme of 
arrangement because it allows the debtor to propose a compromise or arrangement to its creditors and/or 
members and have it approved by a court.97 However, unlike a scheme of arrangement, it may be 
imposed on a dissenting class of creditors (applying a cross-class cram down; it is therefore referred to 
as a “super-scheme”).98 It also requires current or anticipated financial distress of a debtor. As to 
international jurisdiction, a super-scheme seems to follow the same rules as schemes of arrangement.99 
 
92 Re DTEK Finance Plc [2017] BCC 165 and [2016] EWHC 3563 (Ch). See also Re Metinvest BV [2016] EWHC 79 (Ch) at 
[32]. 
93 In the Matter of Noble Group Limited [2018] EWHC 3092 (Ch) at [114] and [116]; Re Van Gansewinkel Groep [2015] 
EWHC 2151 (Ch) at [51]; Re Global Garden Products Italy SpA [2017] BCC 637 at [25] to [28]. 
94 In the Matter of Castle Trust Direct Plc & Ors. [2020] EWHC 969 (Ch); Re Lecta Paper UK [2020] EWHC 382 (Ch); 
Swissport Fuelling Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 1499 (Ch). In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 2191 (Ch), the court, 
dealing with the restructuring plan of Virgin Atlantic, noted that at least one scheme creditor from each class was domiciled in 
England. In Selecta Finance UK Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 2689 (Ch) the court took a slightly different view, noting tentatively 
that the test laid down in Article 8 of the Brussels I-bis “is rather less about the geographical distribution in terms of number 
and size of the prospective defendants, and is rather more about the expediency in case management terms of connected claims 
being resolved in one place, even if only one anchor defendant is domiciled there.” 
95 Commenting on the lack of exact interpretation of the Brussels I-bis and ambiguity of English courts’ position, Kortmann 
and Veder conclude that “there is a substantial amount of uncertainty as to where the boundaries lie with respect to the English 
courts accepting jurisdiction to sanction a scheme.” L. Kortmann and M. Veder, The Uneasy Case of Arrangements under 
English Law in Relation to non-UK Companies in Financial Distress: Pushing the Envelope? NIBLeJ, 3(13), 2015, p. 250. 
96 See Selecta Finance UK Ltd, supra note 94, where for the purposes of establishing the jurisdiction, (i) the governing law of 
senior secured notes was changed from New York to English law; (ii) jurisdictional provisions were changed to provide for 
exclusive jurisdiction of English courts in relation to any proceedings commenced by an obligor; (iii) the newly created English 
company entered into a supplemental trust deed, making it a co-issuer. These steps were interpreted by the court as “good 
forum shopping”. Similar steps (incorporation of a UK company, change of governing law in debt instruments to English law, 
and assumption of debt) have been taken in restructuring of the Dutch retailer HEMA. See In the Matter of Hema UK I Limited 
[2020] EWHC 2219 (Ch), 2020 WL 04354882. 
97 Companies Act 2006, Part 26A, Section 901A. 
98 J. Marshall, J. Cho and G. Orbán, The Big Three: the UK Restructuring Plan, the Dutch Scheme and US Chapter 11 
Proceedings, INSOL World – Second Quarter 2020, p. 27. The first case in which a cross-class cram down was applied 
concerned the Dutch subsea services provider DeepOcean. See In the Matter of Deepocean 1 UK Limited [2020] EWHC 3549 
(Ch), 2020 WL 07409918. 
99 In the Matter of Pizzaexpress Financing 2 Plc [2020] EWHC 2873 (Ch), noting with respect to Part 26A that “this is a new 
jurisdiction albeit closely related to the well-established scheme jurisdiction” and that the “principles that are well established 
in the context of schemes of arrangement” should apply to restructuring plans. 
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A foreign registered company with COMI outside the UK is therefore not prevented from proposing a 
plan so long as there is a “sufficient connection” with the English jurisdiction.100 
B. Jurisdictional Aspect of Third-Party Releases 
To ensure efficiency of a group restructuring, a scheme may operate to release or modify the obligations 
of guarantors and co-debtors to prevent their ricochet (subrogation) claims against the borrower (third-
party or ancillary releases). Where guarantors and co-debtors are group entities registered in countries 
other than the UK, a jurisdictional issue arises. In this scenario, only one group entity (e.g. primary 
debtor, guarantor or co-debtor) is subject to a scheme, but such a scheme is intended to bind scheme 
creditors against other group entities. 
It is well established in English jurisprudence that a scheme can affect the rights of creditors against 
third parties. The question remains, though, what the jurisdictional basis is for the extension of scheme 
effects. In T&N Ltd, the court sanctioned the scheme concerning rights of employees and former 
employees against the debtor’s insurers, noting that “the rights which the claimants had against the 
insurers were sufficiently connected with the claimants’ rights against T&N to bring the proposed 
arrangement within the scope of s425 [Companies Act 2006]”101 (emphasis added). In Re Lehman 
Brothers International (Europe), it was accepted that the release of contractual rights against related 
parties should be available where it is necessary “to give effect to the arrangement proposed for the 
disposition of the debts and liabilities of the company to its own creditors.”102 In Noble Group, it was 
clarified that this would cover any claims “arising out of, relating to or in respect of the Scheme Claims 
and any of the facts and matters giving rise to the Scheme Claims”103 (emphasis added). Thus, it is not 
the territorial connection to England or the use of English law that define jurisdiction to sanction a third-
party release, but the connection of the released claims to obligations of the scheme debtor and the 
effectiveness of the arrangement which come to the forefront.104 This jurisdictional connection is even 
more expansive, as it is not dependent on geographical presence, and relies on the nexus to obligations 
under a scheme in relation to a scheme company that may itself have limited territorial connection to 
the centralizing court. 
In sum, English law subscribes to a “pro-release” approach and the jurisdictional threshold for third-
party releases in schemes of arrangement appears to be rather low. It is even lower than that for bringing 
a debtor company into a scheme (making it a scheme company). Claims arising from various types of 
inter-company liability arrangements (cross-guarantees, co-debtorship, and collateral arrangements) 
facilitating group interconnectedness and interdependence, will commonly be eligible for a release. This 
release can be granted in the case where a scheme company is the principal debtor,105 where it is one of 
the principal debtors,106 as well as where it is a guarantor.107 
 
100 Just like Part 26 (schemes of arrangement), Part 26A (restructuring plans) extends to “any company liable to be wound up 
under the Insolvency Act 1986.” This provision has been interpreted by English courts to include foreign-registered companies. 
Re Drax Holdings Ltd, supra note 84. 
101 Re T&N Ltd (No. 4) [2007] Bus LR 1411. 
102 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (No 2) [2010] Bus LR 489 at [65]. 
103 Re Noble Group Ltd [2019] BCC 349 at [24]. 
104 However, third-party releases are not limited to guarantees and other claims closely connected to scheme claims. For 
example, in In re Lecta Paper UK Ltd [2020] EWHC 382 (Ch), the release extended to claims of scheme creditors against a 
large number of third parties, including directors, legal advisors, financial advisors and other persons. 
105 Re APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch), 2014 WL 5833966. 
106 Re NN2 Newco Ltd [2019] EWHC 1917 (Ch). In this case NN2 was specifically incorporated in England for the purposes 
of facilitating a scheme of arrangement. Upon incorporation, NN2 voluntarily became co-issuer and co-obligor under financial 
obligations, assuming joint and several liability under the debt instruments. The court noted that such technique to create 
jurisdiction for a scheme was not abusive. 
107 Swissport Fuelling Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 1499 (Ch). In this case, the scheme company was a guarantor rather than a 
borrower. It was incorporated in England and Wales, while the borrowers were incorporated in Luxembourg and Switzerland 
Draft, February 2021 
16 
 
C. The Geographical Expansion of Schemes 
English schemes of arrangement have been exported to many Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, South Africa, 
and the Cayman Islands.108 Many of them are close to the English model, both in terms of the substance 
and the jurisdictional rules.109 English schemes have also served as a source of inspiration for recent 
reforms in European non-common law jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands and Germany. The result 
is a myriad of scheme options with notable similarities but also some important differences, potentially 
allowing for greater flexibility and choice as will be further discussed in Part IV. This section describes 
the key features of the Dutch and German restructuring laws, focusing again on the cross-border aspects 
– jurisdictional rules adopted in these two countries. 
1. The Dutch WHOA and the Jurisdictional Puzzle 
Insolvency and restructuring law of the Netherlands has gone through a process of significant revision. 
The discussions about reforming the national insolvency law framework to promote the adoption of 
extrajudicial restructuring plans accelerated since 2012 and led to the Act on Court Confirmation of 
Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans (Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord or WHOA), in force since 1 
January 2021).110 Before it, restructuring options in the Netherlands were limited and the existing 
insolvency procedures have proven inefficient in rescuing financially distressed companies.111 As a 
result, many Dutch enterprise groups availed themselves of English schemes of arrangement or US 
Chapter 11 procedures.112 
Under the WHOA, a restructuring plan can be prepared and approved through a public (i.e. publicly 
disclosed) pre-insolvency procedure or by way of a non-public procedure.113 The jurisdiction of Dutch 
courts in the case of a public procedure is determined based on the EIR Recast (subject to its inclusion 
in Annex A). In other words, to take benefit from the public procedure, all companies in the group should 
have COMI or establishment in the Netherlands. In case of a non-public procedure, falling outside the 
scope of the EIR Recast (it excludes non-public proceedings),114 the jurisdiction is established on the 
basis of other EU instruments, or based on the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP).115 
 
and might have been unable to establish a sufficient connection with England. Initially, the borrowers did not have a right of 
contribution or indemnity against the guarantors. However, in order to create interconnectedness (i.e. ricochet claims), the 
scheme company entered into a deed in favor of the borrowers, under which it assumed the position of a primary obligor 
together with the borrowers. 
108 For a review of scheme provisions in some of these jurisdictions, see Payne, supra note 81, Chapter 8. 
109 See Nordic Aviation Capital Designated Activity Company v. The Companies Act 2014 to 2018 (Approved) [2020] IEHC 
445, in which the High Court of Ireland thoroughly analyzed the issue of jurisdiction as applied to third-party releases and drew 
extensively on the cases from Singapore, Australia and England. The court adopted a pro-release approach and embraced the 
“sufficient nexus or connection” test. See also Re PT MNC Investama TBK [2020] SGHC 149, noting that “substantial 
connection clearly encompasses the presence of business activities, control, and assets in Singapore” and holding that even 
though the debtor, an Indonesian company, did not carry on business, register as a foreign company, or have a place of business 
or substantial assets in Singapore, it had a substantial connection with Singapore, since it was the issuer of notes which were 
listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 
110 WHOA, available at https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/35249_wet_homologatie_onderhands. 
111 Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Act on Court Confirmation of Extrajudicial Restructuring Plans. For unofficial 
English translation of the WHOA and related documents, see https://www.debrauw.com/insightsandopinions/draft-bill-
continuity-companies-act-ii-wcoii/. 
112 For example, Van Gansewinkel Groep B.V., Indah Kiat International Finance Company B.V., Estro Groep B.V., Magyar 
Telecom B.V., Metinvest B.V., HEMA B.V., DeepOcean group. 
113 WHOA, introducing Article 369 to the Bankruptcy Act. Apart from the different jurisdictional rules, the only major 
distinction between public and non-public proceedings is that, unlike the latter, public proceedings are publicly disclosed in the 
insolvency and trade registers. In addition, requests to the court are heard in open session. 
114 EIR Recast, Recital 13. 
115 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, Article 3.  
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This means that a Dutch court has jurisdiction in cases where either the applicant or, where there are 
multiple applicants, one of them has its domicile or habitual residence in the Netherlands or where the 
case is otherwise sufficiently connected to the Dutch legal system.116 According to the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the draft WHOA, a sufficient connection may arise from a single group member having 
its COMI or an office in the Netherlands, from the presence of (substantial) assets of the debtor in the 
Netherlands, or if the debtor is liable for debts of another debtor in respect of which the Dutch courts 
have jurisdiction.117 
Thus, if a debtor or a restructuring plan are sufficiently connected to the Netherlands, Dutch courts 
should have jurisdiction to approve the restructuring plan. In a group restructuring context, for such a 
jurisdiction to be established, it is sufficient that at least one group entity has a sufficient nexus to the 
Netherlands. As long as this is the case, Dutch courts will be able to restructure debts of non-scheme 
companies, liable under intra-group liability arrangements (e.g. cross-guarantees, co-debtorship, intra-
group collateral). The tool of third-party releases has been introduced by the WHOA in Article 372 of 
the Dutch Bankruptcy Code. One of the criteria for such releases is that the court would have jurisdiction 
if these third parties themselves offered a restructuring plan. For non-public restructuring plans, the test 
of a sufficient connection discussed above should be used. As a result, if a group’s financing structure 
includes a Dutch debtor or the group issued corporate bonds through a Dutch SPV, the entire group debt 
may be restructured by Dutch courts, even in a situation where all other debtors are located somewhere 
else.118 As a consequence, all related obligations may be restructured via a single restructuring plan. 
Notably, third-party releases are available only to an enterprise group that meets the definition of a group 
under Dutch law. A group is “an economic unit in which legal persons and commercial partnerships are 
organizationally interconnected.”119 The existence of an economic unity and organizational 
interconnectedness are the main characteristics of a group,120 highlighting interdependence of group 
members, importance of group synergies and (typically) centralized management. Thus, third parties 
which are not members of a closely integrated and interconnected group, such as debtor’s directors and 
officers, insurance companies, legal and financial advisors, cannot benefit from a third-party release 
pursuant to the WHOA. Also, entities that are not linked by economic unity are excluded. For example, 
a pure investment company that holds shares in another company may not be associated with that 
company in a group.121 In other words, business and economic reality within the organizational context 
plays a key role. 
2. The German StaRUG and the Question of International Jurisdiction 
Germany reformed its insolvency law in 2020 by passing the Act on Further Development of 
Restructuring and Insolvency Law, incorporating the Enterprise Stabilization and Restructuring Act 
(Gesetz über den Stabilisierungs- und Restrukturierungsrahmen für Unternehmen or StaRUG), in force 
since 1 January 2021.122 The StaRUG aims at creating an efficient framework for restructuring that is 
available to businesses in financial distress outside insolvency proceedings. In this respect, it implements 
 
116 Ibid., Article 6(i) on jurisdiction over insolvency, suspension of payments and debt reorganization procedure for natural 
persons. The WHOA scheme is, however, not listed. 
117 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 111. 
118 Court confirmation of extrajudicial restructuring plans. What you need to know about the new Dutch act, De Brauw 
Blackstone Westbroek, October 2020. 
119 Dutch Civil Code, Book 2, Article 2:24b. 
120 Groene Serie Rechtspersonen, A Kernoverzicht bij: Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 2, Artikel 24b [Groep], A.F.M. Dorresteijn 
bewerkt door M. Olaerts, 2019. 
121 Asser/Maeijer, Van Solinge & Nieuwe Weme 2-II* 2009/816. 
122 StaRUG, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/starug/BJNR325610020.html. 
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the provisions of the EU Restructuring Directive,123 but also draws on English schemes of arrangement 
and Dutch WHOA schemes. 
Following the Dutch approach, the StaRUG too provides for a dual track which includes public and non-
public procedures. Thus, the debtor should decide whether to operate the restructuring publicly or 
privately. The main and possibly only reason to choose public court assistance over the non-public 
option would be the desire to secure cross-border effects under the regime of the EIR Recast.124 In the 
former case, the court must indicate in its first decision opening the proceeding whether its jurisdiction 
is based on Article 3(1) or 3(2) of the EIR Recast.125 In other words, international jurisdiction for public 
proceedings shall be determined based on the debtor’s COMI or establishment. 
Non-public proceedings are not subject to the EIR Recast and its jurisdictional requirements. Instead, 
their jurisdiction is likely to be governed by the Brussels I-bis,126 as well as national rules of private 
international law. Unlike the WHOA, the StaRUG does not specifically clarify which criteria or 
circumstances may be considered in deciding on the jurisdiction for non-public restructuring plans when 
they involve non-German debtors and creditors. Common German doctrine127 suggests that the provision 
regulating territorial jurisdiction also determines international jurisdiction for German courts unless EU 
law is directly applicable. Under this approach, §35 StaRUG would restrict access to German schemes 
to businesses with German COMI unless the Brussels I-bis prevails and German courts decide to follow 
the logic adopted by English courts in interpreting its Article 8(1), described in Part III.128  
Following the English and Dutch examples, the StaRUG seeks to introduce the rules on third-party 
releases. Such releases can be granted to amend or discharge obligations of companies of the debtor’s 
group acting as guarantors, co-debtors, and collateral providers (upstream, cross-stream and downstream 
guarantees and security).129 The possibility to restructure inter-company obligations in a single 
restructuring plan should facilitate centralized group solutions and improve efficiency. Just like the 
WHOA,130 the StaRUG embraces the best interest of creditors test to protect the interests of affected 
creditors (e.g. creditors affected by the release).131 While the StaRUG does not lay down any specific 
jurisdictional requirements for third-party releases, departing from the WHOA in this respect, it 
mentions that such releases should be available to subsidiaries which have provided security to secure 
performance by the debtor. Thus, in line with the English approach, the requisite jurisdictional 
 
123 Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt. 
124 EIR Recast, Articles 19 and 32. 
125 StaRUG, § 84(2). As the application of the EIR Recast requires that the new German (public) StaRUG proceedings are 
listed in its Annex A, this option will only be available once the Annex is amended by the EU legislator. The German legislator 
expects this to be achieved within 18 months and hence suspended the availability of respective rules (§§ 84-88 StaRUG) until 
17 July 2022. 
126 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. See S. Madaus, Auf in die Moderne! Das 
SanInsFOG macht den Restrukturierungsstandort Deutschland 2021 wettbewerbsfähig, 2 Oktober 2020, available at 
https://stephanmadaus.de/category/news/. Applicability of Brussels I-bis to non-public preventive restructuring proceedings 
has been supported in D. Skauradszun, W. Nijnens Brussels Ia or EIR Recast? The Allocation of Preventive Restructuring 
Frameworks, International Corporate Rescue, Vol. 16, Issue 4, 2019, pp. 193-201. Applicability of the Brussels I-bis to German 
non-public schemes would result in their automatic recognition within the EU (Article 36), unless a substantive matter of the 
decision would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction provisions, especially for matters relating to rights in rem in immovable 
property in Article 24(1), and reserve jurisdiction for another country. 
127 See the German Federal Court of Justice in BGH NZI 2009, 859 at para. 21. 
128 Unless the CJEU would rule that these proceedings meet the insolvency exception in Article 1(2)(b) Brussels I-bis and are 
therefore excluded from its scope. In which case, the jurisdictional basis of Article 8(1) Brussels I-bis would no longer be 
available. 
129 StaRUG, § 2(4). 
130 WHOA, Article 384(3). 
131 StaRUG, § 26(1). 
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connection seems to relate to the inter-company obligations in question, rather than the domicile or some 
other connection of subsidiaries – security providers. 
 
IV. Group Restructuring and Regulatory Competition 
A. Regulatory Competition: Positive and Negative Externalities 
The rise of schemes may be attributed to various reasons. At least in the EU, the Restructuring Directive 
mandates Member States to establish preventive restructuring procedures, which should allow debtors 
to restructure before they become insolvent. The adoption of the new legislation in the Netherlands and 
Germany has been influenced and expedited by the harmonization drive of the Restructuring Directive. 
Another important reason is regulatory competition. This competition creates a market for corporate 
restructurings and is based on: (i) the diversity of legal rules applied in different countries; (ii) the 
incentives for countries to compete to attract restructuring cases; and (iii) the feasibility of choice by 
market participants.132 In this article, regulatory competition is understood broadly to also include 
reforms of national laws, driven by the desire to allow local businesses to efficiently restructure locally, 
rather than to attract foreign businesses. The reforms of Dutch and German law have at least partly been 
facilitated by the goal of creating an efficient restructuring framework or a domestic alternative to stop 
movements of Dutch and German companies abroad (i.e. case retention rather than case attraction).133 
The Restructuring Directive and various international soft law instruments134 promote harmonization in 
insolvency and restructuring law. In many core aspects new restructuring proceedings converge (e.g. 
class formation, availability of interclass and cross-class cram down). Nevertheless, full harmonization 
has not been achieved and will likely not be achieved in the near future, or ever.135 For example, 
differences may be found in the rules on voting thresholds,136 applicable standards for approving 
restructuring plans, duration of a moratorium in support of restructuring, formulation of “best interests 
of creditors” test,137 degree of court oversight and involvement, differences in class categorization, 
availability and scope of third-party releases, and the possibility to terminate or amend executory 
contracts.138 These differences may create incentives for market participants to choose a particular forum 
 
132 H. Eidenmüller, The Rise and Fall of Regulatory Competition in Corporate Insolvency Law in the European Union, 
European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 20, 2019, p. 549. 
133 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 111; Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Fortentwicklung des Sanierungs- und 
Insolvenzrechts, 14 Oktober 2020. 
134 Among such soft law instruments are the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (four parts), The World Bank 
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/debtor Regimes (2015) and the EBRD Core Principles of an Effective 
Insolvency System (2020). 
135 Eidenmüller, supra note 132, at 560, noting that the Restructuring Directive contains more than 70 regulatory options, 
leaving plenty of room for experimentation. 
136 For example, under Article 381(7) of the WHOA, a class of creditors is considered to have accepted the plan if a group of 
creditors that together represent two-thirds of the total amount of the claims of the creditors who cast a vote in that class has 
voted in favor. Pursuant to Article 383(1), for a cross-class cram down it is sufficient that at least one in-the-money class of 
creditors has accepted the plan. In contrast, the StaRUG in §25 requires that at least three-fourths of the total amount of creditor 
claims in a class support the restructuring plan. For a cross-class cram down to be imposed, it is necessary that the majority of 
classes approve the plan – as opposed to the WHOA, where one supporting in-the-money class of creditors is sufficient. 
137 The Restructuring Directive allows EU Member States to select the thresholds determining the best‐interest‐of‐creditors test 
in national law. Such thresholds may include alternative liquidation scenarios (piecemeal liquidation or sale of the business as 
a going concern) or the next‐best‐alternative scenario. See Article 2(1) and Recital 52. For discussion of the EU best‐interest‐
of‐creditors test, see A. Krohn, Rethinking priority: The dawn of the relative priority rule and the new “best interests of 
creditors” test in the European Union, International Insolvency Review, 17 December 2020 (online version). 
138 The WHOA provides for the termination or amendment of executory contracts in Article 373. The draft StaRUG initially 
contained a section on contract termination (§§ 51 ff. RegE). However, during the final deliberations, it was decided to remove 
this section. 
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to implement a restructuring. Flexible jurisdictional rules applicable to schemes enable the choice.139 
However, the extent to which parties will take advantage of this choice, remains to be seen. It will also 
likely depend on many other factors, beyond law on the books, including the institutional environment, 
efficiency of a court system, expertise of judges and insolvency practitioners and wider legal culture. 
Regulatory competition can serve as a driver for reform resulting in positive externalities, including in 
the form of more efficient legal frameworks benefiting various stakeholders.140 Countries can learn from 
each other and borrow best practices to solve similar problems in a similar way,141 as well as innovate 
further and propose alternative approaches. However, regulatory competition might also create negative 
externalities, arising from lower protective standards afforded to certain groups of market participants, 
representing a “race to the bottom”.142 Negative externalities particularly affect those persons who 
cannot exercise legal mobility and select a legal regime. In the insolvency or restructuring context, this 
group of persons may be represented by non-adjusting creditors (e.g. tort victims), since they have no 
real opportunity to affect the choice of an insolvency forum or applicable law. 
In the EU, the EIR Recast recognizes the potentially negative effects of insolvency forum selection. It 
states that for the proper functioning of the internal market, it is necessary “to avoid incentives for parties 
to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a more 
favorable legal position to the detriment of the general body of creditors.”143 To prevent abusive forum 
shopping, the EIR Recast embraces several safeguards, including the COMI test with its elements of 
“regularity” and “objective ascertainability”, and the suspect periods neutralizing the registered office 
presumption.144 The same concepts generally apply globally, where COMI determines recognition and 
relief, as discussed in detail in Part V. To the extent that schemes use flexible connecting factors and in 
the event that they fall outside the scope of international insolvency instruments, they may not be subject 
to similar safeguards. For example, the Dutch and German non-public plans described in Part III will 
likely not fall under the EIR Recast but rather under the general instrument for recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial cases, the Brussels I-bis, which does not seek to 
counter abusive forum shopping. It also does not provide adequate safeguards to allow for a collective 
or semi-collective process to consider the interests of affected stakeholders.145 
B. Jurisdictional Conflicts and Protection of Legitimate Expectations 
The use of flexible criteria of sufficient connection may also lead to a situation of jurisdictional plurality, 
where courts of two or more countries may (potentially) exercise jurisdiction to open proceedings and 
sanction a scheme. This problem becomes even more acute in view of the growth of the market for 
 
139 Arguably, the choice of an insolvency forum and insolvency law is also feasible in practice, but it requires an effective 
COMI-shift, which might be complex and expensive. 
140 H. Eidenmüller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations, Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2011, p. 748, concluding that “[r]egulatory competition between the legal products 
of different states and the law market are, in principle, to be assessed positively and used as a process to discover which law is 
best.” See also G. McCormack, Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings, The Cambridge 
Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2009, p. 179, underlining that the “scope for competition and innovation at a national level may 
lead to a great release of energy and creativity.”  
141 Nevertheless, legal transplantation does not work in every case. See e.g. S. Ferreri and L. DiMatteo, Terminology Matters: 
Dangers of Superficial Transplantation, Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 37, 2019, p. 35, noting that 
“[s]uperficial transplantations are doomed to failure and likely to cause negative consequences such as jurisprudential chaos.” 
142 See J. Stark, Law for Sale: A Philosophical Critique of Regulatory Competition, OUP, 2019, Chapter 2. 
143 EIR Recast, Recital 5. 
144 Pursuant to Article 3(1) EIR Recast, the place of the registered office shall be presumed to be the COMI, unless the registered 
office has been moved “within the 3-month period prior to the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings.” 
145 D. Skauradszun, W. Nijnens, The Toolbox for Cross-Border Restructurings Post-Brexit – Why, What & Where? NIBLeJ, 
7(1), 2019, noting that “[o]ne can debate at length whether these safeguards provided for in the EIR are really effective to 
prevent abusive forum shopping, but if anything is clear then it is that these safeguards are much more effective than the 
application of Brussels I.” 
Draft, February 2021 
21 
 
restructuring procedures. While in the past, foreign companies often resorted to English schemes of 
arrangement or to the US Chapter 11 to restructure their liabilities, in the future, there will be a whole 
range of restructuring procedures available in multiple European and non-European jurisdictions. 
Jurisdictional plurality is problematic for two reasons. First, it may contribute to jurisdictional conflicts, 
leading to the breakup of a case and hindering a centralized group restructuring.146 Second, it can run 
contrary to the principles of protection of trust, certainty of transactions and creditors’ legitimate 
expectations. When extending credit, a reasonable creditor undertakes an assessment of risks related to 
financial distress and insolvency of its counterparty. It includes the ascertainment of a jurisdiction of 
prospective restructuring or insolvency proceedings and applicable law. Put simply, “[p]eople need to 
be sure about their legal rights and positions.”147 In the environment of jurisdictional plurality, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to determine such positions and price the risk of failure. This uncertainty 
and instability may increase the cost of finance.148  
One may object by noting that oftentimes schemes of arrangement are used to restructure debts owed to 
sophisticated counterparties. These counterparties (e.g. banks, noteholders) are likely to be advised by 
professional advisers and, unlike some trade creditors, could choose between different investment 
opportunities and diversify their risks accordingly.149 They should also anticipate that a debtor in a state 
of financial distress will try to select a restructuring forum favoring its restructuring plans.150 While 
financial creditors may be better positioned to calculate risks related to restructuring or insolvency, this 
does not address the problem of jurisdictional plurality affecting centralized restructuring and the costs 
involved in investigating the plethora of potentially applicable laws. Certainly, sophisticated creditors 
can negotiate governing law and choice of court with built-in safeguards against change of terms in the 
financing documents. This, however, does not completely solve the problem, as the court approving a 
scheme may not be bound by an exclusive choice of forum clause.151 Besides, the efficiency of schemes-
inspired restructuring procedures as tools to re-balance the capital structure of a company will be 
 
146 The Brussels I-bis mitigates the risk of jurisdictional conflicts and conflicting judgments by laying down the lis pendens 
rules in favor of the court first seised to decide on jurisdiction (Article 29). However, these rules do not eliminate the possibility 
of cherry-picking a favorable jurisdiction before the first motion is filed. Moreover, conflicting proceedings can still be opened 
if the case falls outside of the scope of the Brussels I-bis. This applies to English schemes of arrangement instituted after the 
end of the transition period (i.e. 31 December 2020), unless a special arrangement is made between the EU and the UK. The 
UK has applied to accede to the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Lugano Convention). In the absence of the Brussels I-bis and the Lugano Convention, jurisdiction could 
be determined in accordance with the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (where there is an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement), bilateral agreements and in other cases in accordance with common law. Notably, neither the Lugano 
Convention nor the Hague Convention extend to insolvency and analogous proceedings, and therefore would likely be 
inapplicable to English super schemes. See In the matter of Gategroup Guarantee Limited [2021] EWHC 304 (Ch), concluding 
that English restructuring plans are within the insolvency exclusion of the Lugano Convention. 
147 R. Bork, Principles of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Intersentia, 2017, para. 4.56. 
148 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles, CUP, 2002, p. 115, arguing that “[u]ncertainty […] 
increases credit costs.” 
149 S. Paterson, Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness, The Modern Law Review, Volume 80, Issue 4, 2017, pp. 600-623, 
discussing the issue of fairness in debt restructuring and arguing that the notion of fairness should be addressed in application 
to particular circumstances (SME debt restructuring, large corporate debt restructurings implicating only financial creditors, 
etc.). 
150 I. Mevorach and A. Walters, The Characterization of Pre-insolvency Proceedings in Private International Law, European 
Business Organization Law Review, 21, 2020, p. 877, noting that in skinny restructurings, “the creditors are invariably 
sophisticated multinational parties whose expectations will be shaped as much by prevailing trends in the restructuring market 
as by contract.” 
151 See Re Tiger Resources Ltd [2019] FCA 2186, where the Federal Court of Australia held that the exclusive jurisdiction 
clause did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the English courts in relation to the proposed scheme of arrangement. The case 
related to a guarantor scheme (guarantor being an Australian company) affecting obligations of the primary obligor, 
incorporated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), concerning debt governed by English law. Interestingly, in this 
case restructuring could have been sought in three jurisdictions, i.e. the DRC – the primary debtor jurisdiction, the UK – a 
jurisdiction whose law governed the debt, and in Australia – where the parent company (i.e. guarantor) was incorporated. Read 
further P. Apáthy and A. Dick, Australian Restructuring: Legislation, Transactions and Cases, GRR, 16 November 2020. 
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hindered should they be limited to financial creditors and exclude lessors and trade creditors. Indeed, 
neither the WHOA nor the StaRUG appear to restrict their scope to any particular type of creditors, and 
therefore can in principle be utilized for both financial and operational restructuring.152 
 
V. Cross-Border Recognition of Centralized Group Solutions 
Against the backdrop of desired levels of centralization for group restructurings, proliferation of scheme 
options and potential opportunities but also risks of loosened jurisdictional thresholds, we ask in the rest 
of this article whether the system of UNCITRAL Model Laws for international insolvency effectively 
and fairly supports group restructurings. The efficiency of group restructurings will be significantly 
undermined should they be deprived of recognition and support on a global scale. Domestic private 
international law rules are of limited assistance in this respect, if they are not sufficiently harmonized or 
if domestic rules do not match the norms on the international level.153 Within a region such as the EU 
there may be means to support schemes to the extent that the EIR Recast or the Brussels I-bis apply, but 
these frameworks are limited in their geographical reach.154 
We start with examining the MLCBI – the major instrument for cross-border recognition of insolvency 
proceedings. In Part II, we noted that the MLCBI, creating an international framework for recognition 
of foreign insolvency proceedings,155 was not drafted with group insolvency in mind. We also pointed 
out that the MLCBI endorses the concepts of COMI and establishment for the purposes of determining 
whether a foreign proceeding can be recognized and what relief is available to such a foreign proceeding. 
The question remains – does the MLCBI provide a solid foundation to facilitate the recognition of group 
restructurings, reached via schemes or similar proceedings? 
A. Presence of COMI or Establishment as a Precondition for Recognition 
The Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the MLCBI (Guide to the MLCBI) explains that a “foreign 
proceeding should be recognized as either a main proceeding or a non-main proceeding.”156 This 
conclusion is based on Article 17(2) of the MLCBI, according to which a foreign proceeding shall be 
recognized (a) as a foreign main proceeding, if it takes place in a state of debtor’s COMI, or (b) as a 
foreign non-main proceeding if the debtor has an establishment in the originating foreign state.157 The 
Guide to the MLCBI makes it clear that “[p]roceedings commenced on a different basis, such as presence 
 
152 For example, the WHOA has a special rule related to a separate class of small trade creditors and tort claimants. The 
members of this class may not receive a distribution lower than 20% of their claim, unless there is an imperative reason for 
offering a lower distribution (Article 374(2)). It also has rules on the protection of security for new funding, ability to continue 
essential contracts despite default by providing security for the performance of new obligations, invalidation of ipso facto and 
change of control clauses, ability to reject onerous contracts, etc. Thus, it has a large arsenal of tools, beyond those available 
in English schemes, to implement a full scale financial and operational restructuring. Because of its multi-purpose and multi-
faceted nature, the Dutch WHOA may be compared to US Chapter 11. 
153 The application of domestic insolvency and private international law rules, not based on the MLCBI, could complicate 
recognition of schemes and scheme-like procedures. Thus, it is far from obvious that schemes falling outside the scope of the 
regional instruments would be recognized in a country like Germany under its domestic private international law system. In 
the Equitable Life Insurance case (BGH, 15 February 2012, IV ZR 194/09), the German court concluded that English schemes 
were not capable of being recognized under the German Insolvency Act. It reasoned that the schemes were not functionally 
comparable (in terms of the main features) to insolvency proceedings under German law because they required neither 
insolvency nor collectivity. It was therefore not possible to rely on national insolvency law to recognize them. At the moment 
it is likely that solvent and semi-collective schemes cannot be recognized in Germany. 
154 For example, Article 8(1) of Brussels I-bis, usually relied on by courts to extend jurisdiction to creditors, domiciled outside 
the scheme jurisdiction, applies only in respect of scheme creditors domiciled elsewhere in the EU and not outside the EU.  
155 As of January 2021, legislation based on the MLCBI has been adopted in 49 states in a total of 52 jurisdictions. 
156 Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 2013, para. 31. 
157 The MLCBI does not define COMI but states that “[i]n the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor’s registered office 
[…] is presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main interests” (Article 16(3)). 
Draft, February 2021 
23 
 
of assets without a centre of main interests or establishment, would not qualify for recognition under the 
Model Law scheme.”158 
A number of the MLCBI-based jurisdictions have followed this interpretation. For example, the US 
Bankruptcy Courts have refused to recognize foreign proceedings on the basis that a debtor did not have 
COMI or establishment in the originating state.159 This approach was noted to reflect “a U.S. legislative 
policy to provide the assistance of its bankruptcy courts only to those foreign bankruptcy proceedings 
that are premised on a tangible presence of the debtor in the foreign jurisdiction.”160 A similar position 
was taken in cases from Australia and New Zealand.161 
Thus, pursuant to the MLCBI, recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding may be denied if such a 
proceeding originates from a no-COMI and no-establishment jurisdiction. As noted above, schemes may 
not depend on either COMI or establishment. The presence of assets, creditors, a single group entity, or 
applicable law may be enough to constitute a sufficient connection for a scheme to be sanctioned, 
including a scheme restructuring debts of non-scheme companies. These factors will likely be 
insufficient to confirm COMI or establishment as interpreted under the MLCBI. As a result, there is a 
risk that some of the schemes may fall outside the scope of the MLCBI, potentially jeopardizing their 
cross-border efficiency. 
A good example is the scheme concerning Mood Media Corporation and its subsidiaries.162 Mood Media 
Corp was a Canadian company that together with fourteen direct and indirect US subsidiaries was 
subject to the arrangement under the Business Corporations Act in Canada (CBCA).163 The debtors 
sought recognition of the Canadian proceedings in the USA as foreign non-main proceedings. The 
arrangement approved by the Canadian court required the creditors of Mood Media Corp to exchange 
their notes and to release any guarantee claims against the US companies. In refusing recognition of the 
arrangement as applied to such companies, the US court held that: (i) the US companies were 
beneficiaries rather than debtors in the foreign proceeding, and (ii) the US companies had no office or 
physical presence in Canada. As a result, the court concluded that the US subsidiaries did not maintain 
“a place of operations in Canada” and therefore did not have COMI or establishment in Canada. This 
finding, however, did not stop the US court from recognizing third-party releases, as following from the 
recognition of the arrangement concerning the parent company, which had its COMI in Canada. 
It should be noted that countries have enacted the MLCBI with some notable differences, which may 
also affect the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings not based on either COMI or establishment. 
For example, the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) defines a foreign non-main 
proceeding as “a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding.”164 Thus, it drops the 
 
158 Guide to the MLCBI (2013), para. 32. 
159 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd. (Bear Stearns II), 374 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Serviços de Petróleo Constellation S.A., 600 B.R. 237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), noting that “[i]f a 
proceeding does not qualify as a main or nonmain proceeding, it cannot be recognized under chapter 15.”; In re British Am. 
Ins. Co., 488 B.R. 205, 213 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013), pointing out that Chapter 15 “reflects a policy determination by 
UNCITRAL and Congress that this Court should not assist a representative of a foreign action unless the debtor has a sufficient 
presence in the country in which the foreign action is taking place.” 
160 D. Glosband, Bankruptcy Court Rejects Cayman Proceedings of Bear Stearns Hedge Funds, ABI Journal, Vol. XXV, No. 
10, December/January 2007. 
161 See Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd v. Legend International Holdings Inc [2016] VSC 308, where the Australian 
court refused to recognize the Chapter 11 proceeding on the basis that the Australia-incorporated debtor had neither COMI nor 
establishment in the USA. Actions necessary to comply with auditing requirements in the USA were held to be insufficient to 
create an establishment. Gainsford v. Tannenbaum [2012] FCA 904. See also Williams v. Simpson [2011] 2 NZLR 380, where 
the High Court of New Zealand refused to recognize the English bankruptcy proceeding because the debtor had neither COMI 
nor establishment in England. 
162 In re Mood Media Corporation, 569 B.R. 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
163 Canada Business Corporations Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44), sec. 192. 
164 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36), sec. 45(1). 
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requirement of “establishment” for the qualification as a non-main proceeding. It was pointed out that 
because Canadian law does not require that an establishment exists as a condition for recognition of 
non-main proceedings, Canadian courts may be less likely to refuse recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings.165 In Syncreon Group B.V.,166 the Canadian court granted recognition of the English 
scheme of arrangement adopted with respect to Dutch-incorporated Syncreon B.V. It reasoned that since 
the debtor did not have a COMI in the UK, the foreign proceeding should therefore be recognized as a 
non-main proceeding. Due to the differences in transposition of the MLCBI and its interpretation, there 
may well be a situation where the same scheme is eligible for recognition in some countries but not in 
others. This could create complexity and legal uncertainty, but also new planning opportunities. 
More generally, the MLCBI is less readily applicable to decentralized groups, namely to group structures 
where entities have had separate COMIs in different countries rather than a common one typically at the 
group headquarters. For centralized groups, a group restructuring may take place in a country where all 
group entities’ COMIs are located or where there is a combination of COMI and establishments,167 
enabling recognition of all proceedings as foreign main or non-main proceedings, achieving a Level 4 
centralization (or Level 3 if a single IP is appointed). COMI can also facilitate a Level 2 centralization, 
through a third-party release granted in a main proceeding and its subsequent recognition abroad. 
However, the case appears less straightforward where the group is decentralized. The MLCBI does not 
contemplate any specific mechanism for groups that would take account of different group structures. 
Thus, even if COMI indicates the connection between one of the entities and the jurisdiction executing 
a scheme, participation by other group members that ought to be involved in the restructuring may not 
be recognized and given effect to. 
B. Involvement of Solvent Companies in Group Restructurings 
The characteristic feature of a group restructuring is that it typically involves one or more group entities 
that are not insolvent or financially distressed. Nevertheless, their engagement might be necessary to 
reach a feasible restructuring outcome. This is the case where a negotiated restructuring plan entails 
contributions from a solvent group entity, including the extension of a loan, guarantee or collateral. Such 
an entity may possess certain assets and data which are indispensable to the insolvency solution being 
developed for the enterprise group. It can also protect its own interests. Inclusion of a solvent group 
member is particularly justified in groups with a significant degree of interdependence or control, where 
distress cannot be resolved at a single-entity level and requires a group-wide solution. This view is held 
by UNCITRAL, which emphasized in the Legislative Guide, Part three that “[t]he inclusion of a solvent 
group member may facilitate the development of an insolvency solution for the whole group.”168 For 
example, such a solution could result in the adoption of a reorganization plan covering the assets of 
insolvent and solvent group entities.169 
 
165 S. Bomhof & A. Slavens, Shifting Gears in Cross-border Insolvencies from Comity to COMI, Banking & Finance Law 
Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2008, p. 58, available at http://www.martindale.com/matter/asr-517160.pdf. See also A. MacFarlane 
and T. Gertner, Foreign Non-Main Proceedings and the Public Policy Exception – A Comparison of Canadian and American 
Insolvency Regimes, in J. Sarra (ed.), Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2015. 
166 Syncreon Group B.V., Re, 2019 ONSC 5774, 2019 CarswellOnt 16582. 
167 See In the Matter of Videology Limited [2018] EWHC 2186 (Ch), where the jurisdictional concentration was achieved 
through the recognition of foreign non-main proceedings (based on the finding of establishment in the USA) and granting of 
relief as if such proceedings were in fact foreign main proceedings, as well as declining to open parallel proceedings in the UK 
(COMI-forum). Thus, a group restructuring could proceed uninterrupted in the USA (a non-COMI forum, but an establishment-
forum).  
168 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part three, Chapter II, para. 13. See Recommendation 238. 
169 Ibid. 
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In order to benefit from the WHOA, the debtor must be in a situation in which it may reasonably be 
assumed that it will be unable to continue paying its debts (i.e. likelihood of insolvency).170 Court-based 
restructuring support tools offered by the StaRUG are available only to a debtor that is prospectively 
cash flow insolvent (illiquid) within the next 24 months.171 Restructuring plans (super-schemes) under 
Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 are accessible to a company that “has encountered, or is likely to 
encounter, financial difficulties that are affecting, or will or may affect, its ability to carry on business 
as a going concern.”172 These tests set the criterion of financial distress as an entry requirement to access 
the restructuring tools. However, they do not prevent solvent entities from voluntarily taking part in a 
restructuring plan and contributing to it, inter alia, by providing financing. A scheme of arrangement 
approved under English law may in principle include both financially distressed or insolvent and solvent 
group entities. The pivotal question remains whether a scheme or a restructuring plan involving solvent 
group companies could be recognized pursuant to the MLCBI. To answer this question, we will look at 
its material scope. 
The MLCBI applies to recognition of a foreign proceeding that is “a collective judicial or administrative 
proceeding [...], pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs of 
the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or 
liquidation.”173 The Guide to the MLCBI clarifies that the term “insolvency” refers to collective 
proceedings “commenced with respect to debtors that are in severe financial distress or insolvent”174 
(emphasis added). It adds that a proceeding to wind up a solvent entity should not be considered an 
insolvency proceeding for the purposes of the MLCBI. If the proceeding has several purposes, including 
winding up of a solvent entity, it only falls within the scope of the MLCBI if the debtor is insolvent or 
in severe financial distress.175 It appears that insolvency or serious financial distress are needed for a 
foreign proceeding to be eligible for recognition under the MLCBI, as originally contemplated. 
However, if strictly followed, this interpretation impedes recognition of schemes or restructuring plans, 
involving solvent or not severely distressed group entities. The case of a group restructuring is quite 
different from a solvent winding up procedure, referred to in the Guide to the MLCBI, where only 
shareholders’ rights are at stake.176 The requirement of insolvency or financial distress for the 
recognition of a centralized group restructuring was discussed in the case of the Croatian extraordinary 
administration proceedings, opened against Agrokor and its group entities.177 
 
170 WHOA, Article 370(1). 
171 InsO, § 18(2). S. Madaus, A Giant Leap for German Restructuring Law? The New Draft Law for Preventive Restructuring 
Procedures in Germany, OBLB, 26 October 2020, available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-
blog/blog/2020/10/giant-leap-german-restructuring-law-new-draft-law-preventive. 
172 Companies Act 2006, Part 26A, sec. 901A(2). 
173 Model Law 1997, Article 2(a). 
174 Guide to the MLCBI (2013), para. 48. See also para. 67, reiterating that the focus of the MLCBI is upon “severely financially 
distressed and insolvent debtors”. The Guide to the MLCBI (1997) is similar, as it points out in para. 51 that the MLCBI applies 
in cases of collective proceedings opened with respect to insolvent debtors. It clarifies in para. 71 that the term ‘insolvency 
proceeding’ is intended to “refer broadly to proceedings involving companies in severe financial distress”. 
175 Guide to the MLCBI (2013), para. 48. 
176 There are conflicting views on whether solvent winding up is covered by the MLCBI’s recognition and assistance regime. 
For example, in Carter v. Bailey & Anor (Sturgeon Central Asia Balanced Fund Ltd) [2020] EWHC 123 (Ch), the English 
court terminated the earlier recognition order given to a liquidation of a solvent investment fund incorporated in Bermuda and 
concluded that “it would be contrary to the […] purpose and object of the Model Law to interpret “foreign proceeding” to 
include solvent debtors.” In In re Betcorp Ltd, 400 B.R. 266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009), the US court took a different view, holding 
that that a solvent members’ voluntary winding-up was entitled to recognition under the MLCBI, as long as a liquidation was 
authorized or conducted under a law related to insolvency or the adjustment of debts. In Re Chow Cho Poon (Private) Ltd 
[2011] 80 NSWLR 507, the Australian court accepted that a winding-up order of a Singapore company based on “just and 
equitable grounds” (and not on insolvency) can be regarded as a foreign proceeding within the meaning given in the MLCBI. 
177 On insolvency of Agrokor read D. Djuric and V. Jovanovic, “Too big to fail”? The Agrokor case and its impact on West 
Balkan economies, International Insolvency Review, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 22-43. See also V. Savković, Universalism 
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The court in Croatia imposed a stay on proceedings and enforcement actions against Agrokor and its 
controlled and affiliated companies. Agrokor sought recognition of the court order in several 
jurisdictions. Courts in Serbia and Montenegro, both of which have transposed the MLCBI, refused to 
recognize the Croatian proceeding on the basis that the extraordinary administration applied to 
subsidiary companies not meeting any of the insolvency conditions.178 The key question was whether 
the MLCBI required all companies involved in a foreign proceeding to be insolvent or financially 
distressed. Contrary to the findings of the above courts, the English court reasoned that the mere fact 
that a subsidiary or an affiliate company, which is not insolvent or threatened to be insolvent, can join 
in the same proceeding as another group entity (e.g. parent company) subject to such a threat, does not 
exclude this proceeding from the scope of the MLCBI.179 It concluded that insolvency (actual or 
threatened) of one company which triggers the proceeding that can be joined by other group entities 
may be qualified as a proceeding filed under the law relating to insolvency covered by the MLCBI. 
This divergence of views on the application of the MLCBI and the proceedings that it applies to may be 
exacerbated by the discrepancy of its implementation at the national level, including with respect to the 
definition of a “foreign proceeding”. Australia, the UK and New Zealand, for example, have not changed 
the definition of foreign proceedings as provided in the MLCBI. The US law adds to the definition that 
a foreign proceeding may relate to “adjustment of debt”.180 Japanese law defines a foreign proceeding 
as a proceeding which corresponds to a (Japanese) bankruptcy liquidation, civil rehabilitation, corporate 
reorganization, corporate readjustment, or special liquidation proceeding.181 Korean law specifically 
refers to rehabilitation, bankruptcy, and other similar proceedings.182 
C. Centralized Group Restructuring, Public Policy and Adequate Protection 
The MLCBI provides that the court should be able to refuse to recognize foreign proceedings or take 
any other action under the regime if that action would be “manifestly contrary” to the public policy of 
the recognizing state.183 It is acknowledged that the intention of the respective norm is that the public 
policy exception should be interpreted restrictively and should be used only in exceptional and limited 
circumstances.184 Importantly, the Guide to the MLCBI clarifies that “[d]ifferences in insolvency 
schemes do not themselves justify a finding that enforcing one State’s laws would violate the public 
policy of another State.”185 
In addition to the public policy exception, the MLCBI stipulates that in granting provisional or 
discretionary relief, the court must be satisfied that the interests of creditors and other interested persons 
are adequately protected.186 The adequate protection safeguard is linked to a balance between a relief 
 
and the recognition of group proceedings under the UNCITRAL Model Law in Montenegro, International Insolvency Review, 
Vol. 28, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 103-125. 
178 Ibid, Djuric & Jovanovic. 
179 Agrokor DD, Re (Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2017] EWHC 2791 (Ch). 
180 11 U.S.C. § 101(23). N. Hannan, Cross-Border Insolvency: The Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, Springer, 2017, p. 65, noting that this addition anticipates recognition of proceedings that aim to restructure the debt of a 
company which may otherwise be solvent. 
181 K. Yamamoto, New Japanese Legislation on Cross-border Insolvency as Compared with the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
International Insolvency Review, Vol. 11, Issue 2, 2002, p. 71, noting that a Japanese court would recognize as a foreign 
insolvency proceeding a proceeding that does not make debtor’s insolvency a precondition for its commencement. 
182 Wai Yee Wan, G. McCormack, Implementing Strategies for the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Divergence 
in Asia-Pacific and Lessons for UNCITRAL, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 3, 2020, p. 79, arguing 
that schemes of arrangement are likely to be considered similar to rehabilitation proceedings in South Korea. 
183 MLCBI, Article 6. 
184 Guide to the MLCBI (1997), para. 89 and (2013), paras. 30 and 104. Countries have not transposed the MLCBI in a uniform 
way. For example, Singapore omitted the word “manifestly” in relation to public policy. In Re Zetta Jet cited above, the court 
concluded that due to this omission, “the standard of exclusion on public policy grounds in Singapore is lower than that in 
jurisdictions where the Model Law has been enacted unmodified.” The exact contours of this standard are not entirely clear. 
185 Guide to the MLCBI (2013), para. 30. 
186 MLCBI, Article 22(1). 
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that may be granted to a foreign proceeding and the interests of the affected persons, including local 
creditors.187 In practice, the adequate protection argument may be used to refer to procedural 
participation and fairness, order and priority of asset distribution in a foreign proceeding as compared 
to the local one, and identity of entitlements. In In re Artimm, it was clarified that “sufficient protection” 
(the term used in the US legislation instead of “adequate protection”) embodies three principles: (i) just 
treatment of all holders of claims against the bankruptcy estate, (ii) protection of US claimants against 
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in the foreign proceeding, (iii) distribution of 
proceeds of the foreign estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by US law.188 
It has been argued that the potentially broad application and interpretation of the adequate protection 
rule can lead to a result contrary to the principles of modified universalism.189 The question is whether 
differences between scheme laws can lead to a denial of recognition and/or relief on the basis that it 
would be in breach of public policy or due to a lack of adequate protection afforded to creditors or other 
parties in a foreign state. This question may be particularly acute regarding third-party releases and 
cross-class cram down where these are allowed and utilized in a foreign group scheme. 
1. Recognition of Third-Party Releases 
Third-party releases is a tool for centralized group restructuring as it permits addressing liability of group 
entities in one jurisdiction and in one proceeding. It thus falls under Level 2 in the taxonomy offered in 
Part II. While some jurisdictions adopt a “pro-release” approach (e.g. Ireland, Singapore, Australia, 
Canada, England and Wales), many other jurisdictions prohibit them, or allow them only in exceptional 
instances. For example, third-party releases are not permissible in a rescue plan under Japanese law 
unless all creditors consent.190 In the United States, courts either disallow third-party releases or permit 
them in unusual circumstances. This hesitation can be explained with reference to the US Bankruptcy 
Code,191 as well as to the potential risk of their abuse.192 
The approach of the US courts to the recognition of foreign restructuring plans or schemes, entailing 
non-consensual third-party releases has not been straightforward. For example, in the case of In re 
Vitro,193 the foreign IP filed a motion for the recognition of a reorganization plan approved in Mexico. 
 
187 Guide to the MLCBI (2013), para. 196. 
188 In re Artimm, S.r.l., 335 B.R. 149 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005), cited in In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 731 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009) and In re ENNIA Caribe Holding N.V., 596 B.R. 316 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
189 Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 3, at 219. See Akers v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 
(2014) 311 ALR 167; 100 ACSR 287; [2014] FCAFC 57, concerned with protection of local creditors (revenue claims) in case 
of remitting the funds from Australia to a foreign proceeding, and noting that “the sacrifice of the rights (or the value in the 
rights) of local creditors upon an altar of universalism may be to take the general informing notion of universalism too far.” 
See also In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. 310 (Bankr. E.D.Okla. 2012), holding that the differences between US and Italian law, 
especially as to whether creditors with set off rights were treated as having secured claims, prevented the US court from finding 
that creditor’s interests would be adequately protected if it were instead required to turn over retainage for administration by 
Italian court. For other examples, see Digest of Case Law on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (2020), 
available at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency. 
190 Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency in Asia 2020, ABLI Legal Convergence Series, 2020, p. 406. 
191 11 U.S. Code § 524(e), which provides that a “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other 
entity on, or property of any other entity for, such debt.” The minority of circuit courts (Ninth, Tenth and Fifth circuits) have 
adopted a restrictive view on third-party releases, ruling that § 524(e) altogether prohibits them. Other circuit courts may under 
certain conditions be willing to consider and approve third-party releases. Courts in these circuits focus on § 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which grants them equitable powers to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code].” See Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow 
Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002) at 657–658, stressing that a third-party release is “a dramatic measure to be 
used cautiously.” In re Millennium Lab Holdings II LLC, 945 F.3d 126 (3rd Cir. 2019), holding that the existence of the 
nonconsensual third-party releases and injunctions contained in the proposed reorganization plan was “integral to the 
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship,” and so the bankruptcy court had constitutional authority to confirm the plan. 
192 See In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136 (2nd Cir. 2005), warning that “a nondebtor release is a device that 
lends itself to abuse. […] In form, it is a release; in effect, it may operate as a bankruptcy discharge arranged without a filing 
and without the safeguards of the Code.”  
193 In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 473 B.R. 117 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 2012). 
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This plan discharged the obligations of the third-party guarantors – US-registered subsidiaries, which 
themselves were not part of the Mexican proceedings. The recognizing court declined recognition and 
enforcement. It noted that the Mexican insolvency proceeding by permanently enjoining creditors’ 
claims against debtor’s subsidiaries drastically altered treatment which such creditors would otherwise 
receive (since their rights against the guarantors are cut off) and that their interests have not been 
sufficiently protected. It concluded that “the protection of third party claims in a bankruptcy case is a 
fundamental policy of the United States” and that the plan, containing a third-party release, was 
manifestly contrary to such public policy.194 
Nevertheless, in other instances courts did not find that third-party releases violated public policy or 
constituted an obstacle to recognition of a foreign scheme or reorganization plan. For example, in In Re 
Metcalfe,195 the court stressed the narrow interpretation of the public policy exception and underlined 
that the relief granted in a foreign proceeding, including a third-party release, did not need to be identical 
to the one available in the USA.196 Schemes and restructuring plans that release affiliate guarantees have 
been recognized in more recent cases,197 including cases involving group restructurings.198 Alongside 
recognition decisions, courts have also granted relief suspending actions against third parties, including 
group guarantors, to assist in and maintain the integrity of the administration of foreign insolvency 
proceedings.199 
2. Recognition, Absolute Priority Rule, and Cross-Class Cram Down 
One of the heavily debated issues in restructuring law in recent years concerns differences between the 
priority rules in domestic regimes, including the absolute priority rule (APR), the relative priority rule 
(RPR) and their various iterations.200 Priority rules play an important role in the application of the cross-
class cram down mechanism. This mechanism is one of the key tools offered by many schemes and 
restructuring regimes. It aims at overcoming the hold‐out problem and allows a plan confirmation 
despite its rejection by the dissenting classes of creditors. This section describes the APR and the RPR 
 
194 In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1042 (5th Cir. 2012) affirmed this decision, relying on the fact that the plan had 
only one class of unsecured creditors and that the necessary creditor votes to approve the plan were only achieved by counting 
the votes of insiders. Under US bankruptcy law, the votes of insiders are not counted (11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10)). The Court of 
Appeal did not state its position on the argument of a public policy violation. 
195 In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments, 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
196 This idea has been embraced in other cases. See In re Rede Energia S.A., 515 B.R. 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), referring to 
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99 (Court of Appeals of New York 1918), stating that “We are not so 
provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.” In re Agrokor d.d., 
591 B.R. 163 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
197 In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 570 B.R. 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Avanti Communications Group PLC, 582 B.R. 603 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018), distinguishing this case from In re Vitro and highlighting near unanimous support of the scheme by 
creditors, excluding support by insiders. The court also noted that the failure to enforce guarantor releases could result in 
prejudicial treatment of creditors “to the detriment of the Debtor’s reorganization efforts and prevent the fair and efficient 
administration of the Restructuring”; In re Olinda Star Ltd., 614 B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020), noting that creditors had a 
full and fair opportunity to vote and be heard in connection with the BVI scheme and that courts have previously granted 
permanent injunctions to support proper implementation of foreign schemes of arrangement. 
198 For example, In re Avanti Communications Group PLC, 582 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) concerned recognition of the 
UK scheme of arrangement, which involved debt restructuring of a large corporate group, with guarantees of the debt issued 
by the affiliates (direct and indirect subsidiaries of the scheme company). In re Agrokor d.d., 591 B.R. 163 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2018), recognizing and enforcing the restructuring plan reached in the Croatian proceeding with respect to foreign debtors, 
which released and discharged written guarantees by non-debtor affiliates of both the English law and New York law debt. 
199 CT Inv. Management Co., LLC v. Carbonell, 2012 WL 92359 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), holding that the laws of Mexico and the 
United States need not be identical for extension of comity to be appropriate. For the opposite view, see In re Qimonda AG, 
482 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012), where the court agreed with the decision in In re Vitro, which held that extending the 
automatic stay to debtor’s subsidiaries would be contrary to basic US bankruptcy law. A. Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign 
Restructuring Plans in Anglo-US Private International Law, Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal, Vol. 3, 2015, 
pp. 375-392, pointing out that the US reception of schemes from sister common law jurisdictions has been consistently 
generous. 
200 See R. Mokal, The Court Discretion in Relation to the Part 26A Cram Down, Journal of International Banking and Financial 
Law, 36(1), 2021. 
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and discusses whether the differences between them may have an effect on the cross-border recognition 
of centralized group solutions under the MLCBI. 
The absolute priority rule has been characterized as the “organizing principle of the modern law of 
corporate reorganizations”,201 the “cornerstone of reorganization practice and theory”202 and 
“bankruptcy’s most important and famous rule.”203 The APR gives protection in a situation of a cross-
class cram down by requiring that a dissenting class of creditors receives the full value before creditors 
of a lower class receive or retain anything under the plan.204 The APR was developed in the USA in the 
early 1900s to address the equity receivership system, which favored insiders at the expense of 
unsecured creditors.205 The rule is now codified in the US Bankruptcy Code.206 The rationale of this rule 
is that it implements the payment priorities existing outside bankruptcy,207 therefore contributing to legal 
certainty and protecting parties’ expectations. This should ultimately contribute to reduced costs of debt. 
It has also been pointed out that the APR encourages parties to reach an agreement, as cross-class cram 
down depends on full payment according to the pre-established distribution waterfall.208 
Despite its long existence, the APR has not escaped criticism. Some scholars have called it “defective” 
to the extent that it may incentivize dissenting (holdout) behavior and prevent efficient restructuring.209 
The rigidity and inflexibility of the APR was also recognized by the American Bankruptcy Institute 
(ABI), which acknowledged that while ensuring important creditor protection, the rule “has proven to 
be inflexible and often a barrier to a debtor’s successful reorganization.”210 Various alternatives have 
been proposed, most of which considered the possibility of offering junior (including out-of-the-money) 
creditors value under a reorganization plan to incentivize their engagement.211 
The Restructuring Directive has also departed from the strict adherence to the APR model and embraced 
a more flexible model, oftentimes referred to as the relative priority rule. It allows a partial distribution 
of the reorganization surplus to junior creditors, including shareholders, as long as senior creditors are 
 
201 D. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, Vol. 165, No. 4, 2017, p. 786. 
202 B. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 44, 1991, 
p. 123. 
203 M. Roe and F. Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, Virginia Law 
Review, Vol. 99, 2013, p. 1236. 
204 If the affected class supports the plan, the departure from absolute priority is permitted. 
205 See e.g. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552 (1899), holding that “no such proceedings can 
be rightfully carried to consummation which recognize and preserve any interest in the stockholders without also recognizing 
and preserving the interests, not merely of the mortgagee, but of every creditor of the corporation.” 
206 11 U.S. Code § 1129(b). A form of the APR is the general rule in Italian, Indian and Singapore law. See A. Zorzi, The 
Italian Insolvency Law Reform (November 23, 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492422; D. Kumar, The absolute 
priority rule in Indian insolvency law, Insolvency Intelligence, 33(3), 2020, pp. 87-95; Wai Yee Wan, C. Watters and 
G. McCormack, Schemes of Arrangement in Singapore: Empirical and Comparative Analyses, American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal (forthcoming, 2020), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723104. 
207 E. Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, Annual Survey of American Law, Annual Survey of American Law, No. 1, 1991, 
p. 37, noting that the APR offers a form of creditor protection that attempts “to restrict the ability of corporate owners and 
insiders from depleting a failing business for their own benefit, leaving the creditors with only the empty shell of a business.” 
208 J. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After Jevic, Washington Law Review, Vol. 93, 2018, p. 
672. 
209 L. Stanghellini et al. (eds.), Best Practices in European Restructurings. Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow 
of the Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2018, p. 46. B. Wessels, S. Madaus, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law, 2017, p. 333, noting 
that the “argument that shareholders with no real economic interest cannot claim any value (including the extra value from 
cooperation) as long as creditors have not yet been paid in full has no legal basis.” See also S. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute 
Priority Rule, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, Vol. XXI, 2016, p. 602, arguing that “the desire to apply “strict” 
priority in a reorganization case is seriously misguided. Reorganization is not liquidation. It requires different rules.” 
210 ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Final Report and Recommendations, 2014, p. 213, pointing out 
unfairness arising from valuation and distribution issues in Chapter 11. 
211 D. Baird and D. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, The Yale Law 
Journal, 115, 2006, pp. 1930-1970; A. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, The 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2011, pp. 759-807. 
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treated relatively better.212 The introduction of the RPR model in the EU has sparked further debates 
among academics.213 Following the Restructuring Directive, some jurisdictions decided to depart from 
a strict APR approach. The WHOA incorporates a form of a relative priority (or a flexible or “mitigated” 
absolute priority), under which a deviation from the insolvency ranking of claims may be allowed where 
there are reasonable grounds for it and where it is not detrimental to the interests of the relevant creditors 
or shareholders.214 The StaRUG adopts a “relaxed” absolute priority approach that permits deviations 
from the absolute priority where new value is created by the junior creditor to reorganization (“new 
value exception”) or where the preservation of debtor’s going concern value requires involvement of a 
shareholder class.215 In such cases, insistence on the APR would not be in the interest of creditors whose 
protection this rule is intended to serve. Cross-class cram down in restructuring plans under Part 26A of 
the UK Companies Act 2006 is not dependent on either the APR or the RPR, instead relying on the best 
interest of creditors test.216 This approach is inherited from schemes of arrangement. 
The question which approach is preferable, the APR or the RPR or some other one, is beyond the scope 
of this article. Instead, we ask whether the divergence between the different cram-down models may bar 
recognition of schemes or restructuring plans. Writing on the US law perspective, Junqueira points out 
that “[w]hether a U.S. bankruptcy court should enforce a foreign nonconsensual reorganization plan that 
violates the absolute priority rule is a different and significantly harder question”,217 compared to the 
mere differences in voting thresholds. This is due to the foundational importance of the APR. 
However, a closer look at these approaches perhaps reveals that the similarities are more significant than 
the differences. Notably, US law as a leading regime adhering to the APR has exceptions to absolute 
priority. Chapter 11 has been recently amended to address the needs of small and mid-sized companies. 
Among other things, the new subchapter V on small business debtor reorganization stipulates that the 
rule of the APR does not apply in cases falling under it.218 There are other exceptions to the APR 
developed in practice (e.g. “new value” exception, “gift plan” exception).219 These exceptions indicate 
that the APR, despite its fundamental character and long history, may in fact be departed from where 
other interests take precedence. Thus, while differences in priority rules in the context of schemes may 
provide room for invoking safeguards, the MLCBI and its underlying modified universalist norm may 
ultimately reject such expanded interpretations of either public policy or adequate protection.  
D. Summary: Groups Schemes and the MLCBI 
From the above we can conclude that whilst the MLCBI has not been designed for groups, nor was it 
written specifically with the scheme procedures in mind, it is capable of ensuring recognition of and 
 
212 Restructuring Directive, Article 11(1)(c). As a derogation from the RPR, countries may decide to implement the APR, see 
Article 11(2). 
213 R. de Weijs, A. Jonkers, M. Malakotipour, The Imminent Distortion of European Insolvency Law: How the European Union 
Erodes the Basic Fabric of Private Law by Allowing ‘Relative Priority’ (RPR), Amsterdam Law School Research Paper 
No. 2019-10, 2019, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350375; J. Seymour, S. Schwarcz, Corporate Restructuring under 
Relative and Absolute Priority Default Rules: A Comparative Assessment, University of Illinois Law Review, Forthcoming, 
Vol. 2021, No. 1, 2019, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3498611; A. Krohn, Rethinking Priority: The Dawn of the 
Relative Priority Rule and a New ‘Best Interest of Creditors’ Test in the European Union, 2020, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3554349; S. Madaus, A Simple Guide to the Relative Priority Rule, 20 January 2020, available at 
https://stephanmadaus.de/2020/01/20/a-simple-guide-to-the-relative-priority-rule/. 
214 WHOA, Article 384(4)(b). 
215 StaRUG, § 26. 
216 Companies Act 2006, Part 26a, Section 901G. Dissenting class should not be any worse off than it would be in the event of 
the relevant alternative, which is defined as “whatever the court considers would be most likely to occur in relation to the 
company if the compromise or arrangement were not sanctioned under section 901F.” 
217 T. Junqueira, The Enforcement of Consensual Foreign Plans of Reorganization in Chapter 15, Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal, Vol. 35, 2019, p. 109. 
218 11 U.S. Code § 1181(a). 
219 A. Levitin, Business Bankruptcy. Financial Restructuring and Modern Commercial Markets, Wolters Kluwer, 2nd ed., 2019, 
p. 799. 
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support to centralized group schemes (Levels 2-4). This requires, however, a finding that the entities 
subject to the scheme have their COMIs or at least establishments in the scheme jurisdiction. 
Centralization may also hinge on the possibility of engaging group entities that are not in severe financial 
distress to take part in a group solution and the prerequisite that courts reject the temptation to invoke 
the MLCBI-based safeguards merely because of the differences in restructuring laws, even where they 
otherwise meet the minimum standards of fairness.220 
Indeed, a refusal to recognize and give effect to a foreign proceeding departing from the rules of the 
recognizing state could potentially impact a large number of group restructurings, and undermine their 
efficiency. For example, many countries do not follow the APR approach or provide exceptions to it. 
Among them are the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, South Korea221 and China.222 The risk of non-
recognition of restructuring plans adopted in these countries may not promote the objectives underlying 
the MLCBI, which seeks to create a legal framework that makes cross-border insolvency resolution 
expedient, predictable and efficient. It may also discourage centralized group solutions, facilitated by 
schemes, to the extent that they permit resolution of group financial distress under the same set of rules 
and principles. Instead, group entities would be forced to undergo restructuring in different jurisdictions 
– each under its own rules and standards or even in several jurisdictions simultaneously, to ensure that 
such restructuring will be widely recognized.223 
 
VI. The New Generation of Insolvency Model Laws 
In the introduction, we have posed the question whether the existing international insolvency law 
framework is suitable and capable of promoting centralized group restructurings reached through 
schemes of arrangement or similar restructuring proceedings. We also noted that we focus on high levels 
of centralization (short of substantive consolidation), in particular jurisdictional concentration of the 
restructuring processes (Level 4) and restructuring of group liabilities via a single proceeding (Level 2). 
The MLCBI and legislation based on it have been used as a legal basis to recognize group solutions, 
including those reached via schemes. But there are important “weak spots”, where the application of the 
MLCBI may face roadblocks, leading to inefficiencies and producing legal uncertainty. These concern 
the recognition of foreign restructuring plans: (i) adopted in jurisdictions where a debtor or some of the 
debtors do not have COMI or establishment, (ii) involving both insolvent (financially distressed) and 
solvent group entities, or (iii) confirmed with the application of substantive rules different from those 
applicable in the recognizing forum, in particular those related to the availability of third-party releases 
and the priority rules in cross-class cram down. These weak spots may be attributed to the vagueness of 
 
220 Mevorach & Walters, supra note 150, at 890. 
221 Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency in Asia 2020, ABLI Legal Convergence Series, 2020, p. 719, noting that Korean 
law “merely requires that the ratio of impairment of shareholders is greater than that applicable to unsecured creditors.” 
222 Z. Huimiao, Lame-Duck Bankruptcy Institutions under Government Intervention in Reorganisation of Listed Companies in 
China (Part 1), Hong Kong Law Journal, 46, 2016, p. 370, noting that “[a]mong 45 reorganisation cases, the absolute priority 
rule was breached in 43 cases.” 
223 A similar result is achieved by the application of the Gibbs rule, according to which English courts refuse to enforce a 
foreign restructuring discharging or modifying the terms of English-law-governed debt. For the recent application of the Gibbs 
rule by English courts, see Re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan [2018] EWCA Civ 2802. Hence, in order to restructure 
English-law-governed obligations and to achieve its recognition in the UK, such restructuring needs to be conducted in the UK. 
The Gibbs rule therefore demonstrates an affinity with territorialism. Mevorach notes that in this way it “precludes deference 
to the central court’s insolvency laws and judgments.” See I. Mevorach, Overlapping International Instruments for Enforcement 
of Insolvency Judgments: Undermining or Strengthening Universalism? EBOR, 2021, online access. Courts in Singapore and 
the USA have chosen not to follow the Gibbs rule. See Pacific Andes Resources Development Ltd [2016] SGHC 210; In re 
Agrokor d.d., 591 B.R. 163 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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some of the rules used in the MLCBI, its focus on single-debtor insolvency (and not on groups), and 
divergence in the transposition of the MLCBI into national law and in its interpretation. 
To complement the MLCBI and to close certain apparent gaps, UNCITRAL has developed two new 
model laws briefly noted earlier – the MLIJ (2018) and the MLEGI (2019). The next section explores 
whether the abovementioned weak spots are addressed by this new generation of the UNCITRAL Model 
Laws. 
A. Centralized Group Restructuring and the MLIJ 
One of the reasons for the development of the MLIJ was the desire to address uncertainty around 
recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in the course of foreign insolvency proceedings.224 
The MLIJ seeks to provide clear rules for recognition of insolvency-related judgments, including those: 
(i) confirming or varying a plan of reorganization or liquidation, (ii) granting a discharge of the debtor 
or of a debt, and (iii) approving a voluntary or out-of-court restructuring agreement.225 Thus, the MLIJ 
may apply to a scheme approved by a court. While the MLIJ does not explicitly address enterprise group 
insolvency, does it nonetheless have the potential to make the recognition of group restructurings more 
secure and predictable? 
According to Article 14(h) of the MLIJ,226 recognition and enforcement of an insolvency-related 
judgment may be refused if the judgment originates from a state whose insolvency proceeding is not or 
would not be susceptible of recognition under the MLCBI. The Guide to the MLIJ clarifies that this may 
be the case where the originating state is neither the location of the debtor’s COMI nor of its 
establishment.227 It explains that this provision is designed to ensure that the regulatory framework of 
the MLCBI is not undermined by the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments, 
which should have been resolved in either a main or non-main proceeding.228 In other words, the MLIJ 
accommodates the idea that main or non-main insolvency proceedings and related actions should be 
concentrated in the same jurisdiction or proceeding. This doctrine is also known as vis attractiva 
concursus.229 Regarding the problem of recognition of group insolvency solutions, originating from a 
no-COMI/no-establishment jurisdiction, this means that the MLIJ does not in principle interfere with or 
depart from the approach taken in the MLCBI. But it provides additional jurisdictional grounds to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. Among them is the exercise by the originating court 
of jurisdiction on the basis that is unfamiliar to the recognizing court or where the exercise of such 
jurisdiction is incompatible with laws of the recognizing state.230  
 
224 The MLIJ was drafted in response to uncertainty created by the UK Supreme Court in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] 
UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236. 
225 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments 
(Guide to the MLIJ), para. 60. 
226 This is an optional provision that may be considered by states which have enacted (or are considering enacting) the MLCBI. 
227 Ibid., para. 117. Article 14(h)(i) and (ii) of the MLIJ provides one exception to the principle of non-recognition of no-
COMI/no-establishment proceedings. This exception applies in a situation where an IP of a main or non-main proceeding (i.e. 
proceedings capable of being recognized) participated in the proceeding giving rise to the judgment in question and this 
judgment relates solely to assets located in the originating state. This exception may facilitate the recovery of additional assets 
for insolvency estate and resolution of disputes related to such assets. 
228 Ibid., para. 118. 
229 This doctrine can be seen in Article 6 of the EIR Recast, under which courts presiding over main, secondary or territorial 
proceedings should have jurisdiction “for any action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely 
linked with them.” Read further on the European approach, Z. Fabok, Jurisdiction concerning annex actions in the context of 
the insolvency and Brussels Ibis regulations, International Insolvency Review, Vol. 29, Issue 2, 2020, pp. 204-233. 
230 MLIJ, Article 14(g)(iii)-(iv). The Guide to the MLIJ, para. 114 clarifies that Subparagraph (g)(iii) should not permit the 
receiving court to refuse recognition and enforcement on the basis that the originating court did not properly exercise 
jurisdiction, if the law of the receiving state would have permitted a court to exercise jurisdiction in parallel circumstances. In 
para. 115 it is explained that Subparagraph (g)(iv) is broader and should “discourage courts from refusing recognition and 
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Thus, it is possible to recognize and enforce a single scheme that affects group entities, or a restructuring 
plan adopted in proceedings opened against several entities in the same jurisdiction (supporting Level 2 
or Level 4 centralizations). But again, there may be a mismatch between the jurisdictional basis applied 
domestically and in a foreign proceeding. Even if the recognizing state decides not to implement Article 
14(h), the court applying the MLIJ may still refuse to recognize and enforce a scheme if, for example, 
it is not familiar with the criterion of “sufficient connection” as a basis for a group scheme, or considers 
that this standard is incompatible with domestic law (Article 14(g)). The MLIJ does not attempt to 
harmonize the jurisdictional bases for recognition and enforcement, resulting in imprecise and subject-
to-interpretation criteria of analogousness and non-incompatibility.231 
As to the involvement of solvent group entities in a group solution, the MLIJ adopts the same approach 
as the MLCBI. The definition of “insolvency proceeding” used in the MLIJ is identical to the definition 
of a “foreign proceeding” used in the MLCBI.232 This coherent terminology may result in interpretation, 
according to which only proceedings opened with respect to a severely distressed or insolvent debtors 
are covered by the MLIJ and its regime for insolvency-related judgments.233 The MLIJ is also quite in 
line with the MLCBI when it comes to a public policy exception and adequate protection of creditors 
with regard to the recognition and enforcement of restructuring plans.234 
In conclusion, while the MLIJ is targeted at recognition of insolvency-related judgments, including those 
approving a restructuring plan, it does not necessarily support centralized group solutions or make their 
recognition more predictable. The MLIJ is not per se concerned with group insolvency. In many aspects 
it follows the MLCBI, and in others it offers additional refusal grounds related to jurisdiction of a foreign 
court. 
B. Centralized Group Restructuring and the MLEGI 
In 2019, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency (MLEGI). This model 
law aims at providing effective mechanisms to address group insolvencies.235 Unlike the MLCBI and 
the MLIJ, the MLEGI is specifically designed to make the administration of cross-border insolvencies 
of enterprise groups more efficient and to facilitate the development of group insolvency solutions. The 
MLEGI offers various tools to support centralized group solutions. Among them are (i) the opening and 
recognition of a planning proceeding and a wide range of relief available to it, and (ii) “synthetic 
proceedings”, which can be used to avoid the commencement of multiple proceedings, specifically in a 
group context, and to facilitate centralized treatment of claims in enterprise group insolvency.236 
The MLEGI does not seek to adjust the concepts of COMI or establishment to permit jurisdictional 
concentration of group proceedings in the same forum. It does not propose a “group COMI” or require 
that COMIs of all participating entities are in the same jurisdiction.237 Instead, the centralizing impetus 
 
enforcement of a judgment in cases in which the originating court’s exercise of jurisdiction was not unreasonable, even if the 
precise basis of jurisdiction would not be available in the receiving State.” 
231 Pottow positively assesses Article 14(g)(iv), arguing that it “could be the start of a new significant strand of private 
international law that provides a doctrinal anchor for meaningful expansion (and a coherent foundation) for indirect 
jurisdiction.” See Pottow, supra note 5, at 501. More skeptically, Mevorach underlines that the MLIJ “is somewhat obscure on 
jurisdictional bases and is not fully consistent with the general cross-border regime.” See Mevorach, supra note 223. 
232 MLIJ, Article 2(a). 
233 Guide to the MLIJ, para. 22. 
234 MLIJ, Articles 7, 14(f). 
235 MLEGI, preamble. 
236 Guide to the MLEGI, para. 200. 
237 UNCITRAL Working Group V discussed the notion of group COMI, noting that “[i]dentifying the jurisdiction most central 
for a corporate group might be assisted by developing a concept of a “corporate group COMI”; or developing a rule deeming 
the COMI of the group to be, for example, the place of registration of the parent of the group or the place where it conducts its 
business activities.” The Working Group acknowledged the difficulties in achieving an agreed definition of a corporate group 
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of the MLEGI comes from enhanced coordination, that can also be achieved by way of a planning 
proceeding. A planning proceeding has been mentioned in Part II, where we noted that it can be opened 
where one of the group members, integral and necessary to the group solution, has its COMI. To support 
the coordination efforts, the MLEGI affords relief to a planning proceeding, which may include staying 
the execution against assets of an enterprise group member, suspending the right to transfer, encumber, 
or otherwise dispose of any assets of the enterprise group member, staying insolvency proceedings 
concerning a participating group member, and authorizing intra-group funding arrangements.238 The use 
of different forms of relief and participation in a planning proceeding can open the doors to procedural 
consolidation, restricting the opening of proceedings in multiple jurisdictions and fostering their 
concentration in a single or a few forums.239 
The MLEGI allows to tighten the centralization even further. It provides for the possibility to defer to a 
concentrated process through the concept of “synthetic” proceedings.240 It stipulates that in order to 
minimize the commencement of non-main proceedings or to facilitate the treatment of claims in a group 
insolvency, “a claim that could be brought by a creditor of an enterprise group member in a non-main 
proceeding in another State may be treated in a main proceeding […] in accordance with the treatment 
it would be accorded in the non-main proceeding.”241 To realize this norm, an undertaking to extend 
such “as if” treatment needs to be made by a main IP or jointly with a group representative (if appointed), 
and a court in the main proceeding should approve the treatment to be accorded in such a proceeding.242 
If an undertaking is made, a court of the potential (“synthetic” or “virtual”) non-main proceeding may 
stay or decline to commence a non-main proceeding.243 
Importantly, the MLEGI also foresees centralization of proceedings by way of a planning or a non-main 
proceeding and by avoiding additional proceedings in multiple jurisdictions. In supplemental provisions 
(Part B), the MLEGI allows for an undertaking to be given by an IP of a group member or by a group 
representative to creditors who might otherwise file their claims in the potential (“synthetic” or “virtual”) 
main proceeding.244 In this case, a court in the jurisdiction of the debtor’s COMI may stay or decline to 
commence a main proceeding.245 The need to commence main proceedings is therefore minimized and 
centralization is achieved through a contract-like arrangement (undertaking) and flexible jurisdictional 
connection (COMI of a single group entity or establishment of relevant group entities). The supplement 
also allows granting additional relief in the form of a stay or declining to open local proceedings 
 
and problems related to foreseeability of a group COMI to creditors. Working Group V, Treatment of Corporate Groups in 
Insolvency, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.76/Add.2, 6 March 2007. 
238 MLEGI separately addresses the relief available to a planning proceeding in a state where such a proceeding has been opened 
(Article 20) and relief that may be granted to a foreign planning proceeding. The latter is divided in provisional (pre-
recognition) relief (Article 22) and relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign planning proceeding (Article 24). 
239 Mevorach, supra note 54, at 527. The use of relief to achieve a centralized group solution characterize In the Matter of 
Videology Limited, cited above. 
240 Different terms have been used to describe the same concept, including “virtual” secondary proceedings and “as if” 
proceedings. See B. Wessels, Contracting Out of Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: The Main Liquidator’s Undertaking in 
the Meaning of Article 18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial 
& Commercial Law, Vol. 9, 2014, pp. 63-110. 
241 MLEGI, Article 28(1). 
242 MLEGI in Article 28(2) specifies that an undertaking “shall be enforceable and binding on the insolvency estate of the main 
proceeding.”  
243 MLEGI, Article 29. The idea of “synthetic” proceedings originates from case law. In Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA and 
other companies [2006] EWHC 1343 (Ch), the English court authorized the joint administrators of an enterprise group to 
implement the assurances given earlier to creditors in the relevant European jurisdictions and hence to depart from the 
application of the ordinary provisions of English law, the law of the main proceedings. As a result, the group restructuring was 
more predictable, centralized and cost-efficient. See K. Ramesh, Synthesising Synthetics: Lessons learnt from Collins & 
Aikman, 2nd Annual GRR Live New York, 26 September 2018, discussing this case and noting the inherent adaptability and 
versatility of synthetic secondary proceeding and their utility in a group insolvency context, as a “powerful tool in the 
restructuring toolkit for facilitating the centralisation of key issues in a single forum.” 
244 MLEGI, Article 30. 
245 MLEGI, Article 31. 
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following recognition of planning proceedings, particularly if an undertaking has been given.246 The use 
of relief and synthetic proceedings should help to avoid duplication of proceedings, minimize costs, and 
achieve procedural consolidation. 
Referring back to the centralization levels, noted in Part I, the MLEGI enables at least Level 4, where a 
group solution, including a restructuring plan, is contemplated in a single jurisdiction, where one of the 
group members has its COMI and other entities (which do not need to demonstrate any connection to 
the planning forum) participate. It can also be used to contemplate a Level 2 concentration where only 
a single process is opened and participation by other members is limited to being affected by the scheme 
without the need to open any additional processes. 
We noted in Part V that participation of solvent group entities in a scheme or restructuring plan might 
cause problems at the recognition stage, since the MLCBI seems to require either insolvency or severe 
financial distress of a debtor. The MLEGI, on the other hand, is open to participation of all group entities 
in a planning proceeding and a group solution, irrespective of their financial status.247 The focus of the 
MLEGI is on usefulness and desirability of an enterprise group member participating in insolvency or 
restructuring proceedings of another group member.248 At the same time, the MLEGI makes it clear that, 
as a general rule, the relief in support of a local249 or foreign250 planning proceeding may not be granted 
with respect to assets and operations of an enterprise group member for which no insolvency proceeding 
has commenced. This does not preclude a solvent group member (or, to be more precise, a group member 
that is not subject to insolvency proceedings) from voluntarily participating in or contributing to a 
planning proceeding. Indeed, such a group member could aid a group solution being developed for other 
group members.251 
Finally, when it comes to the matters of public policy and adequate protection of creditors, the MLEGI 
generally follows the MLCBI and the MLIJ. It includes an overarching rule that a court should be able 
to refuse to take any action if it would be manifestly contrary to the public policy.252 Alongside the 
public policy exception, the MLEGI also contains a provision, drawn upon Article 22 of the MLCBI, 
under which when granting, denying, modifying or terminating relief, a court “must be satisfied that the 
interests of the creditors of each enterprise group member subject to or participating in a planning 
proceeding and other interested persons [...] are adequately protected.”253 But it may be anticipated that 
these safeguards will be even less debilitating in the MLEGI context, where group schemes will be 
contemplated within a comprehensive framework designed for groups. 
 
VII. Centralized Group Restructuring: Weak Spots and Way Forward 
In the previous Parts, we noted the emergence of restructuring procedures which facilitate centralized 
group restructurings, including through jurisdictional concentration of proceedings (Level 4, and Level 
 
246 MLEGI, Article 32. 
247 Guide to the MLEGI, paras. 47 and 111. 
248 Guide to the MLEGI, para. 111. 
249 MLEGI, Article 20(2). 
250 MLEGI, Articles 22(4) and 24(3). 
251 Guide to the MLEGI, para. 134. See also the UNCIRTAL Legislative Guide, Part three, Recommendation 238, stipulating 
that “insolvency law should specify that an enterprise group member that is not subject to insolvency proceedings may 
voluntarily participate in a reorganization plan proposed for one or more enterprise group members subject to insolvency 
proceedings.” 
252 MLEGI, Article 6. The Guide to the MLEGI emphasizes the restrictive interpretation of public policy and adds in para. 65 
that “[c]ooperation among courts, including through the recognition of a planning proceeding, should not be hampered by an 
expansive interpretation of public policy.” 
253 MLEGI, Article 27(1). Guide to the MLEGI, para. 189. 
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3, if a single IP is appointed) or reorganization of group debts via a single proceeding (Level 2). We also 
highlighted that the existing international insolvency law framework, based on the MLCBI, can support 
centralization of restructuring attempts. However, there are bottlenecks or, as we have called them – 
weak spots, which may undermine centralized group restructurings going forward. These relate to the 
material scope of the MLCBI, which may not enable recognition of no-COMI/no-establishment group 
restructuring schemes. The personal scope of the MLCBI can also preclude the involvement of solvent 
group entities in a group solution. The application of safeguards to divergent substantive rules and 
varying standards across jurisdictions could be a barrier as well. The new generation of the UNCITRAL 
Model Laws provide additional mechanisms, but they too have weak spots. In this Part we consider the 
alternative mechanisms and propose certain optional ways to further advance groups restructurings 
within the global cross-border insolvency framework. 
If we consider schemes of arrangement and similar restructuring proceedings to fall under the MLCBI 
– even though they might not be fully collective and insolvency-tested, we subject them to the MLCBI 
requirements. As discussed, a key requirement for recognition and support under the MLCBI is the 
presence of COMI or establishment in the originating state. Since schemes often depart from these 
jurisdictional bases and apply more flexible tests, such as a sufficient connection, there is an inherent 
discrepancy between schemes and the MLCBI-based recognition regime. This mismatch can result in 
legal uncertainty and complicate the recognition of centralized group restructurings.  
One possible solution is, therefore, to change the existing approach under the MLCBI and altogether 
abandon the requirement of COMI or establishment as a precondition to recognition of a foreign 
proceeding. But this may be a step too far, considering that the MLCBI provides a general framework 
for a wide variety of proceedings for the purposes of liquidation or reorganization. While jurisdictional 
flexibility can benefit certain light-touch restructurings, it may not be feasible for fully collective and 
more traditional insolvency proceedings, involving operational restructuring and large numbers of non-
adjusting and trade creditors. The reason is that it is usually more efficient to initiate these proceedings 
at the place of the concentration of debtor’s business activity, that COMI and establishment serve to 
indicate. Equally important is the fact that the MLCBI has proven successful in facilitating cross-border 
recognition and relief, while maintaining a degree of legal certainty and predictability. Although flexible 
jurisdictional rules can promote concentration of proceedings in a single forum, as noted in Part IV, they 
pose a risk of jurisdictional plurality (cherry-picking) and conflicting jurisdictions. They may also run 
contrary to parties’ legitimate expectations because it becomes more difficult to calculate a restructuring 
forum and its applicable law. 
Another solution is to “relax” the determination of COMI and establishment, or to make forum shopping 
more accessible, or to introduce a presumption of “good” forum shopping for the schemes which solely 
aim at restructuring of financial obligations (so called “skinny” restructurings).254 Since bondholders, 
credit institutions and other financial creditors are usually sophisticated counterparties, they are better 
positioned to assess and diversify their risks compared to the majority of trade and non-adjusting 
creditors. Hence, the application of less stringent jurisdictional criteria may be justified. Indeed, many 
schemes are targeted at balance sheet (“skinny”) restructurings, as the scheme model lends itself well to 
a targeted approach.255 Therefore, relaxed rules on COMI and establishment can potentially cover many 
centralized group restructurings discussed in this article. However, the relaxed jurisdictional rules may 
 
254 Indeed, forum selection in the form of movement of COMI prior to commencement of insolvency proceedings to benefit 
creditors as a whole is acceptable under the MLCBI. See Guide to the MLCBI, para. 71 et seq. 
255 Mevorach & Walters, supra note 150, at 864, noting that “skinny restructuring is the main territory of pre-insolvency 
proceedings in practice.” 
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not be optimal for schemes involving operational restructuring and affecting rights of non-adjusting and 
trade creditors. 
The third solution includes promoting centralized group solutions by innovatively applying the various 
tools developed in the newer generation of model laws. These tools (discussed in Part VI) include broad 
relief, a planning proceeding, synthetic main and secondary proceedings, and enforcement of judgments 
including orders related to schemes. We saw that these tools, especially those developed in the MLEGI, 
are quite flexible and as such can potentially facilitate efficient group restructurings. By participating in 
a planning proceeding, granting an undertaking to minimize the number of proceedings, or recognizing 
and enforcing scheme orders, procedural centralization or a single process encompassing multiple 
entities can be achieved without concentrating COMI of all group entities in the same forum. This 
requires, though, the adoption and application of the full range of options in the model laws, including 
the provisions allowing to defer to the group process and avoid opening multiple proceedings, 
contemplated in the supplement to the MLEGI. The fact that some of these provisions are in the 
supplement, a separate part, may result in countries and implementing institutions being reluctant to 
adopt and apply them.256 Furthermore, the presence of COMI of at least one group member that is a 
necessary and integral participant in a contemplated group solution, is still a precondition under the 
MLEGI for the opening of a planning proceeding, and both the MLIJ and MLEGI include safeguards 
which can be relied on to decline granting recognition or relief to a foreign scheme that diverges from 
local laws. These model laws are also currently only an option for countries to consider. While the MLIJ 
and especially the MLEGI can be instrumental in facilitating centralized restructurings, they are not yet 
binding law as they first need to be enacted in national legislation.  
The fourth solution would be to develop a tailor-made international instrument for restructurings, instead 
of trying to fit such procedures into the existing framework.257 This instrument can take the shape of a 
new model law for recognition and enforcement of restructuring plans and proceedings, regardless of 
their full collectivity, debtor’s financial status, or debtor’s COMI or establishment – thus better reflecting 
the developing market and legal practice. This model law may apply flexible jurisdictional criteria and 
jurisdictional review at the recognition stage. In exchange for this flexibility, such a framework may 
place greater ex post control in the form of the adequate protection test. This test could ensure that 
creditors and other interested parties are not disadvantaged by the application of laws in a scheme 
jurisdiction that are different from those that would otherwise apply to restructure their rights or 
obligations (i.e. lex concursus and lex causae). This test is demanding and goes beyond requiring that a 
foreign proceeding complies with broadly recognized principles of insolvency law. Instead, it seeks to 
ensure the entitlement baseline of objecting creditors under the law originally applicable to their claims. 
The idea behind this test underpins the rules on synthetic proceedings found in the MLEGI, since they 
aim to facilitate the centralized treatment of claims in an enterprise group insolvency and in the 
meantime accord the prescribed treatment which creditors would otherwise be entitled to. 
This approach has some notable advantages. First, it gives parties leeway in choosing the restructuring 
forum, permitting centralization of restructuring efforts. Second, it respects the freedom of contract and 
choice of law applicable to a contract. Third, it upholds parties’ legitimate expectations and protections 
afforded by the normally applicable law (lex concursus and lex causae). It also makes it easier for 
creditors to calculate the risks related to investment and prospective restructuring. Nevertheless, while 
 
256 Mevorach, supra note 54, at 528. 
257 S. Madaus, Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to Divide the Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring 
Law, EBOR, 19, 2018, arguing that “simply expanding insolvency rules to (all) restructurings does not seem convincing” and 
suggesting a differentiating solution, based on private international law rules on judgments and contracts. 
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the new state of the art instrument could offer important benefits, it will likely require considerable effort 
to develop in the first place and the political will to adopt it in national law thereafter.  
Earlier in Part IV we noted that the proliferation of schemes and scheme-like procedures has not resulted 
in the full harmonization of applicable rules and standards. This divergence is evident, inter alia, in the 
approaches concerning third-party releases and priorities in the context of cross-class cram down. We 
argue that the application of conflicting rules may cause problems and undermine centralized group 
solutions by depriving them of cross-border recognition and assistance. The public policy exception and 
adequate protection of creditors are an integral part of the existing international insolvency framework 
and fulfil an important defensive function. However, especially the notion of “adequate protection” has 
a strong destabilizing potential and can be difficult to apply in practice. This is because the “adequacy” 
or “fairness” are not defined in the MLCBI (and other model laws) and can be interpreted rather broadly 
to protect local creditors, justify territorialistic biases and hinder centralized restructuring attempts. In 
addition to this ambiguity, in group restructurings, the difficulty may arise from the need to consider the 
interests of creditors of multiple entities, as well as such group entities themselves. 
Ultimately, therefore, it is crucial that countries and parties affected by the relevant centralized group 
restructurings have a certain degree of trust in a foreign legal system and the good faith of stakeholders 
selecting it. This trust should be based on the acceptance that substantive insolvency or restructuring 
laws differ. The mere fact that the law of the recognizing state does not offer the same rule or relief, or 
that its application would have led to a different outcome compared to that reached abroad, should not 
by itself be considered a violation of creditors’ rights (lack of adequate protection) or trigger the public 
policy hammer. In this respect, the way forward may be in further harmonization of substantive 
restructuring law, as well as the additional specification in the way the adequate protection is and should 
be understood and applied in the context of a group restructuring. As we foresee the increasing role of 
the concept of adequate protection in the future, formulation of general principles or guidelines for it 
can be taken up by UNCITRAL and other standard-setting organizations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Efficient administration of insolvency and restructuring proceedings in the context of enterprise groups 
is challenging. Due to legal separateness, distinct proceedings are commonly opened with respect to 
individual entities in a group of companies. Coordination of such proceedings is complicated in an 
international setting. Furthermore, the lack of harmonization of national insolvency and restructuring 
laws, as well as the persistence of territorialistic inclinations and biases could hamper the adoption of a 
coherent group-wide restructuring strategy. 
To reduce the risk of piecemeal liquidation or the cost of unnecessary multiple restructurings concerning 
the same group, a strategy of legal centralization may be utilized. Such centralization can be achieved 
by way of concentrating proceedings of group entities in the same forum or court or through the 
resolution of group distress via a single proceeding opened with respect to a single group entity. In 
practice, both mechanisms are embraced in group restructurings. In this article, we have studied them 
against the background of the increased adoption and use of schemes of arrangement or scheme-like 
procedures permitting centralized group restructuring. This trend seems to, at least partially, be driven 
by regulatory competition creating both positive and negative externalities. 
We have shown that these new restructuring procedures are supported by a solid system of instruments 
developed at the international level. Generally, the UNCITRAL Model Laws concerning cross-border 
insolvency accommodate centralized group solutions and promote their cross-border recognition and 
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enforcement. But we highlighted certain problems or weak spots, which need to be addressed. One weak 
spot relates to the uncertainty and unpredictability arising from incoherent incorporation, interpretation 
and application of national law provisions based on the MLCBI. In part this can be linked to the lack of 
definitions and vagueness of some of the terms used in this instrument. The MLIJ and the MLEGI have 
not yet been enacted in legal systems, but their future implementation may also result in inconsistencies. 
For example, the terms “adequate protection”, “public policy”, “foreign proceeding”, “jurisdictional 
non-incompatibility” found in these model laws, require coherent interpretation and clear international 
standards applied in a group restructuring context. This is particularly topical considering the fact that 
the proliferation of restructuring schemes has not led to full harmonization of national laws. Differences 
between such laws might play a key role in the choice of a restructuring forum but lead to problems at 
the recognition stage. We have noted some of these differences, including the availability of third-party 
releases and the variations in the substantive protections afforded to creditors. 
The rise of schemes and their use for group restructurings also bring up peculiar jurisdictional dilemmas, 
since the sought centralization often departs from the long-established connecting factors of COMI and 
establishment. Jurisdictional flexibility makes centralized debt resolution possible, contributing to cost 
saving and shorter time frames for the completion of restructuring cases. However, it might disconnect 
the restructuring forum from real economic ties, make risk calculation for creditors less straightforward 
and influence creditor participation. It may also result in jurisdictional plurality and conflicts, where 
several courts claim jurisdiction at the same time, undermining centralization efforts. 
Maintaining the jurisdictional flexibility of schemes, permitting centralized group restructurings, while 
discouraging abuse and protecting the interests of creditors and other parties, calls for new and creative 
approaches. This article has considered the various ways of accommodating group restructuring and 
supporting them internationally, including through further development of the international model laws 
system. Radically, we could depart from the requirement of COMI or establishment as a prerequisite to 
recognition under the MLCBI. But this solution would raise concerns about compatibility with the rules 
on relief and protection of parties’ expectations and may not be feasible for many comprehensive and 
collective insolvency proceedings. An alternative and sensible solution could entail a certain relaxation 
of the rules related to the determination of COMI and establishment when applied to restructuring of 
financial obligations via schemes, thus not extending to operational restructuring and leaving trade and 
non-adjusting creditors unaffected. International group restructurings can also rely on the various tools 
available in the model laws system for insolvency using these innovatively, including the more advanced 
solutions proposed in the MLEGI and its supplement. Among these tools are a range of relief that may 
be granted to defer to a centralized group process, the use of main and non-main synthetic proceedings, 
and concentration through the opening and participation in a planning proceeding. Finally, a completely 
new model law may be designed to address the recognition of restructuring plans and proceedings, which 
would better reflect their unique nature, embrace jurisdictional flexibility of schemes, and also introduce 
adequate safeguards to protect the rights and legitimate expectations of the affected parties. 
